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INTRODUCTION
The traditional rule for construing criminal statutes is the
rule of lenity, a name given to a common law principle that "pe-
nal statutes should be strictly construed against the government
or parties seeking to enforce statutory penalties and in favor of
the persons on whom penalties are sought to be imposed."1 The
motivating purpose of the rule is to provide adequate notice to
defendants (due process), and to reinforce the notion that only
the legislature has the power to define what conduct is criminal
and what conduct is not (separation of powers).2
Although widely accepted, the rule is by no means adhered to
universally. The legislatures of many states, frustrated by what
seemed to be unnaturally narrow judicial readings of criminal
statutes, have eliminated the rule of lenity. New York and Cali-
fornia did so more than a century ago.3 Recent academic litera-
l. NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 59.03 (5th ed.
1992).
2. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687, 704 n.18 (1995) (mentioning the rationales).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (West 1988) ("The rule of the common law, that pe-
nal statutes are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code. All its pro-
visions are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view
to effect its objects and to promote justice."); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 5 (McKinney 1998)
("The general rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to
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ture has been critical as well. Professors Jeffries and Kahan crit-
icize the principle on the grounds that its application does not
further its stated rationales-legislative primacy and fair no-
tice.4 Other commentators object to lenity as inappropriate in
particular situations, such as RICO,5 civil bankruptcy,6 govern-
ment corruption cases,' and environmental crimes.' Moreover,
not even lenity's strongest supporters can believe in it without
qualification. Courts have good reason not to want every in-
stance in which statutory language underdetermines meaning to
require acquittal.
This Article takes issue with lenity's critics, new and old. Crit-
ics either assume lenity in a strong version not now used by the
courts, or have too much confidence in how well we can construe
statutes without some overriding principle to resolve ambigu-
ities. The rule of lenity has been narrowed dramatically over
time in response to changes in the ways that courts generally
interpret statutes. In seventeenth century England, a very broad
rule of lenity was developed to thwart the will of a legislature
bent on seeing statutory violators hanged.9 American courts,
notably through Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story, adopt-
ed the rule early on, but with qualifications that gave additional
this chapter, but the provisions herein must be construed according to the fair im-
port of their terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law.").
4. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Pe-
nal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 198-200 (1985); Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal
Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 345-46; see also the benchmark article by
Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. REV.
748 (1935) (discussing the factors that control judges' interpretation of penal stat-
utes).
5. See Bryan T. Camp, Dual Construction of RICO: The Road Not Taken in
Reves, 51 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 61, 61-62 (1994).
6. See Bruce A. Markell, Bankruptcy, Lenity, and the Statutory Interpretation of
Cognate Civil and Criminal Statutes, 69 IND. L.J. 335, 336-37 (1994).
7. See Ross E. Davies, Comment, A Public Trust Exception to the Rule of Lenity,
63 U. CH. L. REV. 1175, 1175 (1996).
8. See David E. Filippi, Note, Unleashing the Rule of Lenity: Environmental En-
forcers Beware!, 26 ENVTL. L. 923, 924-27, 944-48 (1996); Patrick W. Ward, Com-
ment, The Criminal Provisions of the Clean Water Act as Interpreted by the Judicia-
ry and the Resulting Response from the Legislature, 5 DICK. J. ENVIL. L. & POL. 399
(1996).
9. See infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
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deference to the intent of the legislature."0 In the early part of
the twentieth century, American courts began looking seriously
at legislative history and at other extratextual materials as a
routine aspect of the interpretation of statutes. Fueled largely by
a series of opinions by Justice Frankfurter, the rule of lenity
subsequently was narrowed further, relegating it to a tie break-
er only after courts exhausted all other interpretive aids."
Using advances from linguistics and cognitive psychology, this
Article argues that the narrow, Frankfurter approach to lenity
best approximates the way we use language and form concepts.
Early attempts to impose a more mechanical rule of lenity gave
inadequate recognition to the flexibility of our conceptual struc-
ture at the price of undermining legislative intent. The Frank-
furter approach best serves the dual purposes of deference to
legislative will and adequate notice to defendants.
Attempts to dispense with the rule altogether also come at
great expense to widely held jurisprudential values. Language is
sometimes vague and sometimes ambiguous. When we do not
know how a legislature intended a statute to apply even after
careful study, we have to look outside the statutory language for
an answer. This Article argues that the narrow rule of lenity
embodies important values with which we are unwilling to dis-
pense. For this reason, courts in jurisdictions that have elimi-
nated lenity legislatively continue to apply it anyway. For this
same reason, we should not accept academic proposals to elimi-
nate lenity, such as Professor Kahan's proposal to replace lenity
with definitive interpretations by the Department of Justice. 2
Section I of this Article explores the problem that the rule of
lenity is intended to solve: What is it about the way we write
criminal laws that leads to such uncertainty in our understand-
ing of them? Coming to grips with this issue is a prerequisite for
evaluating approaches to the interpretation of criminal statutes.
The relevant literature on criminal statutes rarely addresses
this problem, however, and the courts virtually never do, apart
10. See infra notes 135-78 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 179-228 and accompanying text.
12. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV.
L. REv. 469, 488-89 (1996).
[Vol. 40:57
LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LENITY
from general remarks about the indeterminacies of language.
This Article begins by describing the interpretive problems in
cognitive and linguistic terms, an analysis that serves as a
framework for the remainder of the Article.
Section II describes in more detail the three different ap-
proaches to lenity noted above: the broadest version, used centu-
ries ago by courts in England; the traditional American rule,
developed by John Marshall; and the narrow, Frankfurter ver-
sion. This Article shows that the narrow version grew from a
shift in interpretive style at the beginning of this century, in
which legislative history and other extratextual material began
to play increasingly important roles in statutory construction. By
applying lenity only after taking this extratextual material into
account, courts are likely to find less uncertainty in statutory
meaning, and therefore apply lenity less frequently. This Article
proposes that Frankfurter, not wanting to concede that his nar-
row version of lenity was a departure from tradition, literally
fabricated history to make it appear consistent with earlier cas-
es, including Marshall's opinions.
Section III examines how these issues show themselves in the
Rehnquist Court's approach to interpreting criminal statutes.
For the most part, the Court uses the narrow version of lenity.
Justice Scalia's efforts to unseat the Frankfurter approach and
return lenity to its nineteenth century form have been largely
unsuccessful. This section also discusses the manner in which
the current Court gives broad scope to certain statutory terms in
light of the cognitive framework described in Section I.
Section IV discusses attempts to eliminate lenity legislatively,
and evaluates suggestions by scholars that lenity should be
eliminated in favor of other values, including Professor Kahan's
recent proposal that the Chevron doctrine should replace lenity.
This section shows that these efforts fail both because lenity
reflects such deeply entrenched values that courts continue to
apply it in certain circumstances even when the legislature has
enacted laws against it, and because they do not account ade-
quately for cognitive difficulties in statutory interpretation.
Section IV is followed by a brief conclusion.
19981
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I. A LINGuIsTIc APPROACH To PROBLEMS IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
Two issues predominate in disputes over the scope of criminal
statutes: (1) ambiguity; 3 and (2) problems of conceptualization
resulting from poor fit between the words of a statute and the
events in the world. Courts historically have treated these inter-
pretive problems quite differently from one another.
A. Ambiguity
A criminal statute is ambiguous, in a narrow sense relevant
here, when it refers to P, P can alternatively encompass either a
or b, and it is beyond dispute that the defendant did a." To il-
lustrate with a classic example of ambiguity from the linguistic
literature, the sentence "flying planes can be dangerous" 5 can
mean either "it can be dangerous to fly planes" or "planes that
are aloft can be dangerous." We recognize this ambiguity be-
cause we have tacit knowledge of the syntactic structures of the
sentences we speak and hear. The sentence "flying planes can be
dangerous" can be analyzed as having a syntactic structure
associated with either reading. Our syntactic knowledge, howev-
er, takes us no further than this. We must infer from context
which reading a speaker intended. If the context does not re-
solve the matter because it is insufficiently robust, we will sim-
ply suffer a partial failure in communication. When this happens
in the interpretation of criminal statutes, it motivates applica-
tion of the rule of lenity.
13. See, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) ("Moreover, be-
cause the governing standard is set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to
apply the rule of lenity in resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's cov-
erage.").
14. Professor Jeremy Waldron defines ambiguity as follows:
An expression X is ambiguous if there are two predicates P and Q which
look exactly like X, but which apply to different, though possibly overlap-
ping, sets of objects, with the meaning of each predicate amounting to a
different way of identifying objects as within or outside its extension.
Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82
CAL. L. REV. 509, 512 (1994). As an example, he contrasts the color blue and the
emotion blue. See id.
15. NoAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX 21 (1965).
[Vol. 40:57
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The same holds true for word meaning. When we hear the
word "bank," we know that this word in English refers to the
earth along a river, or to a financial institution. For communica-
tion to be successful, we must determine from context and every-
day experience which of these two uses of the word the speaker
had in mind. The speaker's choice of the word "bank" instead of
the word "cheese" reduces the universe of possible interpreta-
tions enormously. To resolve any residual uncertainty, we rely
on context and our knowledge of how the word ordinarily is
used. The choice of word itself takes us only so far.
Despite the fact that lenity often is stated in terms of ambigu-
ity, most lenity cases involve conceptual difficulties 6 as op-
posed to ambiguity. Some do, however, concern ambiguity. Con-
sider, for example, Liparota v. United States,'7 which involved
the interpretation of an ambiguous mens rea requirement in a
criminal statute. In that case, a jury had found the defendant
guilty of food stamp fraud." The applicable statute reads in
part: "[Whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or
possesses coupons, authorization cards, or access devices in any
manner contrary to [the statute] or the regulations" is subject to
a fine and imprisonment. 9 Liparota, who owned a lunch coun-
ter in Chicago, had been purchasing food stamps for less than
their face value from an undercover government agent.2" The
regulations clearly prohibited this.2' Liparota admitted buying
the food stamps, and admitted that he bought them knowingly,
but he argued that the statute was ambiguous with respect to
the scope of "knowingly."2 The government took the position
that "knowingly" should be construed to modify "uses, transfers,
acquires, alters, [or] possesses coupons or authorization cards,"
but not to modify, "in any manner contrary to [the statute] or
16. See infra text accompanying notes 28-121.
17. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
18. See id. at 422-23.
19. 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1994).
20. See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 421.
21. See id. at 420-21.
22. See id. at 421-23.
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the regulations."" On the other possible reading, for which
Liparota argued, "knowingly" modifies both phrases.
The availability of these two readings, in fact, reflects a well-
known property of adverbial scope in English.24 Compare the
language of the statute with the following example: "The pitcher
intentionally tries to hit a batter in the head with a ball every
Saturday." This sentence is similarly ambiguous. We know that
the pitcher intentionally tries to hit a batter in the head with a
ball, and we know that he tries to do this every Saturday, but
we do not know whether he intentionally has chosen Saturdays
to do this.
The availability of the reading of "knowingly" that requires a
knowing violation of the statute, Liparota argued, should trigger
the rule of lenity. The Court agreed. Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority, examined the statute's language, its legislative
history, and relevant canons of construction. Unable to glean
from this investigation any clear notion of what Congress in-
tended the state of mind to be for conviction under the statute,
he applied the rule of lenity. Brennan explained: "Application of
the rule of lenity ensures that criminal statutes will provide fair
warning concerning conduct rendered illegal and strikes the ap-
propriate balance between the legislature, the prosecutor, and
the court in defining criminal liability."
Although Brennan invoked both of lenity's rationales, actual
notice seems less central than does separation of powers.26
From Brennan's perspective, it made perfectly good sense to
exercise this level of conservativism in interpreting criminal
statutes, and to require the legislature to expand the scope of
any statute that the courts have misjudged.27
23. See id. at 423.
24. See, e.g., RAY S. JACKENDOFF, SEMANTIC INTERPRETATION IN GENERATIVE
GRAMMAR 47-107 (1972). For a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see
LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 66-75 (1993).
25. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427.
26. This Article argues that notice does play a role in the jurisprudence of statu-
tory interpretation even when a defendant has not read the statute. See infra notes
359-89 and accompanying text.
27. Congress rarely will do so when a court has applied lenity. Congressional
overrides occur with great frequency, however, when the Supreme Court decides a
case based on the "plain language" of a statute whose language is not really plain.
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B. Conceptual Problems
1. The Psychology of Conceptualization
We often have the experience of attempting to find the word
that best fits the events that occur in the world around us. For
example, we might have the following conversation:: "Is it rain-
ing?" "No, it's just drizzling." In this dialogue, the second speak
is telling the first that raining does not describe fairly the
weather because there is another concept that better describes
it. It also would have been possible for the second speaker to
say, "Yes, but it's only drizzling." Thus, we have two truthful
answers to the question "Is it raining?"--Yes" and "No."
This kind of dilemma, which occurs frequently, creates a po-
tential calamity for legal interpreters. It takes only the smallest
elaboration to transform our hypothetical dialogue into a rule
that makes it illegal to require construction crews to work out-
doors when it is raining. If both "yes" and "no" were appropriate
answers to the hypothetical inquiry posed above, then both "yes"
and "no" are appropriate answers to the question, "has the em-
ployer violated the rights of workers by requiring them to work
outdoors when there was only a drizzle or a fine mist?" If both
"yes" and "no" are fair answers to this question, we do not know
whether the employer has violated the rule.
This problem arises because of the way in which we form con-
cepts. The classical view of concept formation says that to know
a concept is to know the conditions under which it obtains. In
this framework, the concept rain, for example, obtains just when
(that is, if and only if) water falls in drops from the sky. Sister
obtains when an individual is a female sibling, and so on. This
classical view of word meaning claims that to know a word is to
know its definition. The perfect definition will contain all of the
conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for membership
in the category that the word represents. The definition of rain
will define all and only rain.28 It will contain those conditions
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 347, 450-55 app. (1991); Lawrence M. Solan, Learning
Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 235,
236-39.
28. Seen this way, it is possible for a definition to be too good, in the sense that
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that are both necessary and sufficient for us to know when the
expression "It is raining" is true, and when it is false.
In the 1970s, work in cognitive psychology produced a radical
shift in our understanding of how words represent concepts. In
particular, the pioneering work of Eleanor Rosch demonstrated
that at least part of our knowledge of concepts is better charac-
terized in terms of prototypes for categories." Thus, when we
use the word rain, we have some idealized sense of what it
means for it to be raining. If it is a sunny, dry day, we will have
no problem saying that it is not raining. If it is raining in more
or less our idealized fashion for a long enough period of time, we
will have no trouble saying that it is raining. For the in-between
experiences, the drizzles, brief showers, cold rains bordering on
hail, and so on, however, we become uncertain about whether
the word rain, or another concept, is more appropriate. As we
stray farther from prototypical instances of a concept, new con-
cepts begin to invade their territory. Significantly, because pro-
totypes are formed, reinforced, and at times changed as the
result of cumulative experience, experts often refer to prototype
theory as a probabilistic model of conceptualization."0
Prototype theory explains a great deal that classical theory
could not. First, it explains our intuitions that some members
are better examples of a category than others. Rosch's experi-
ments showed, for example, that people typically regard chairs
as prototypical examples of furniture, and lamps as marginal
ones.3 A second, related advantage of prototype analysis is that
it is not troubled by what Wittgenstein called "family resem-
blance" categories.3 Wittgenstein pointed out that the concept
the definition is more precise than the word being defined. Philosophers of language
refer to these as "precisifying definitions." See Roy Sorensen, Vagueness and the De-
siderata for Definition, in DEFINITIONS AND DEFINABILUTY: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES 71, 71-72 (James H. Fetzer et al. eds., 1991).
29. See, e.g., Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories, 104
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 192 (1975).
30. See, e.g., MARY B. HOWES, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN COGNITION 206-08
(1990).
31. See Rosch, supra note 29, at 229. I discuss this phenomenon in Solan, supra
note 27, at 270-75.
32. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 31-32 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958).
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game appears to extend to a family of activities that share fea-
tures, but that no particular set of features is both necessary
and sufficient to define a category that contains all and only
games. 3 Third, prototype theory correctly predicts that con-
cepts will become fuzzy at the margins. As the precipitation falls
progressively harder, we reach a point at which we simply do
not know whether we can still characterize it as a drizzle. Sub-
sequently, if it continues to intensify, we become more and more
certain that we have left the world of drizzle for the world of
rain, or even downpour.34
These facts are legally significant. For example, Steven Win-
ter uses prototype analysis to explain a great many legal phe-
nomena in which the issue is a decision about conceptualization,
ranging from standing doctrine to the constitutionality of the
one-house veto of attorney general decisions." Studies also
have shown prototype construction to explain juror conduct.36
In the realm of statutory interpretation, judges often evoke the
canon that they are to give words in a statute their "ordinary"
meaning.37 Prototype analysis tells us that the notion of ordi-
33. See id.
34. This fact is inconsistent with Aristotelian notions of logic in which all proposi-
tions are assigned truth values (that is, they are either true or false depending on
whether they meet the criteria for inclusion in a set). See Jack F. Williams, The
Fallacies of Contemporary Fraudulent Transfer Models as Applied to Intercorporate
Guarantees: Fraudulent Transfer Law as a Fuzzy System, 15 CADOZO L. REV. 1403,
1450 (1994). Logics that take the possibility of vagueness into account, however, can
describe prototypes. This observation is important, because it suggests that a
definitional approach to word meaning is indeed possible, as long as the definitions
themselves include fuzzy conditions. This Article explores the possibility that some-
thing like this is the best approach. For an extremely interesting article that argues
that one such logic (supervaluation theory) is superior to another (fuzzy logic), see
Hans Kamp & Barbara Partee, Prototype Theory and Compositionality, 57 COGNITION
129 (1995).
35. See Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Gov-
ernance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1385-86 (1988). Winter's forthcoming book, A Clear-
ing in the Forest (University of Chicago Press) reformulates much of this work. Win-
ter and I take slightly different positions with respect to some of the psychological
literature, but the differences are not significant with respect to issues raised in this
Article. Other legal scholars have used similar insights to explain legal reasoning.
See, e.g., Gerald P. L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984) (using the
notion of "stock stories").
36. See Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal
Concepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857, 868-70 (1991).
37. See, e.g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 107-08 (1990) (stating that
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nary meaning has a cognitive basis. Moreover, statutes often are
vague. That is, it is sometimes hard to tell whether what has
happened in the world properly fits into the categories that a
statute proscribes. Prototype analysis predicts this as well.
Finally, prototype analysis explains why it is that we might
make category errors. If we focus on the prototype, we may
wrongly use an overinclusive or underinclusive category, only to
discover later the poor fit between disputed events and statutory
categories. This is why Justice O'Connor can argue that trading
a gun for cocaine is "using a firearm" for purposes of interpret-
ing a sentence-enhancing statute, and Justice Scalia can reply in
dissent that swapping does not come to mind when we utter the
phrase "use a firearm.
9
Despite all of these advances, questions remain concerning
how we acquire and access concepts. For one thing, experimental
research seems to indicate that given the choice between sorting
novel things by family resemblance or by a single, defining fea-
ture, people prefer to use the single feature. In a series of stud-
ies, Douglas Medin and a group of psychologists presented sub-
jects with drawings of novel cartoon characters that differed on
a number of dimensions (e.g., number of legs, shape of face,
stripes or spots on body, length of tail)." The psychologists
asked the subjects to divide the drawings into two piles "in a
"falsely made" includes causing a government agency to issue genuine documents
based on false information).
38. Professor Waldron defines vagueness as follows:
A predicate P is vague if there are objects or instances x,, x 2, etc. within
the domain of the normal application of terms of this kind such that us-
ers are characteristically undecided about the truth or falsity of "x, is P,"
"x2 is P," and they understand that indecision to be a fact about the
meaning of P rather than about the extent of their knowledge of x,, x2,
etc.
Waldron, supra note 14, at 513. Waldron makes this distinction to exclude from
vagueness cases in which one knows perfectly well what a category contains, and
would be able to tell whether a particular example fit within the particular category
if only one studied the examples in more detail. See id. For example, uncertainty
about whether the fruits on a tree seen at a distance are apples or pears does not
illustrate vagueness.
39. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 230 (1993); id. at 245 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), discussed infra text accompanying notes 108-10.
40. See Douglas L. Medin et al., Family Resemblance, Conceptual Cohesiveness,
and Category Construction, 19 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 242 (1987).
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way that seem[ed] natural or sensible."4 Subjects almost al-
ways chose one feature (e.g., number of legs) as the defining one,
and sorted that way. They did not group drawings with the
most features in common to create family resemblance catego-
ries.43
This is not to say that Medin and his colleagues found no pro-
totype effects. While virtually all subjects attempted to discover
a defining feature rather than a sense of overall similarity, not
all available defining features were equally salient." About half
the subjects selected shape of face as the single defining feature,
indicating, consistent with prototype analysis, that this is
cognitively a "better" defining feature. 5
Only when the features were related conceptually did subjects
begin sorting into family resemblance categories with more
frequency.46 In yet another experiment, the psychologists gave
subjects a set of file cards, each containing a list of five symp-
toms, and asked them to put the cards into two equal groups
that made sense.47 The first symptom was loss of sleep, which
was present on half the cards, and stiff muscles, present on the
other half.48 Of the remaining four, two were clearly related
(e.g., dizziness and earache), and two were less obviously related
(e.g., sore throat and high blood pressure). 9 Although it was
possible to sort the cards based only on the first dimension,
people preferred to sort by correlated attributes. 0 The results
41. Id. at 247.
42. See id. at 248-254.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 254.
45. See id. In some experiments there were four possible defining features; in oth-
ers, six. See id. Interestingly, when the experiments introduced variability to make
them more realistic (e.g., faces were either vertically or horizontally oriented, but
otherwise did not look exactly the same as one another), the number of legs became
the leading defining feature. See id. Variability in appearance could not overcome
the ease with which we can count either four or six legs. This finding highlights the
way in which we attempt to find unique properties to define our categories.
46. See id. at 264-67.
47. See id. at 266.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 265-67. A similar experiment was conducted with features of ani-
mals, rather than disease symptoms, with the same result. See id. at 266-67. Both
experiments were designed with appropriate care. For example, the related symp-
1998]
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suggest that family resemblance categories may reflect our theo-
rizing more abstractly about clusters of factors that we regard as
important. Some have suggested, for example, that we form
categories purposively to meet goals.5
Similarly, language acquisition experiments appear to demon-
strate both types of learning in children, with preference for one
or the other type of information dependent upon the age of the
child. When asked about the meanings of words, children at first
rely principally on salient characteristics, as prototype theory
would predict, but later form theories based on defining fea-
tures.52 Crucially, as children form theories, the theories them-
selves constrain the ways in which they further generalize their
concepts as they gain new experience."
Many psychologists now believe that concepts contain both
probabilistic information and incomplete theories that we revise
with experience.54 The more difficult question is how we struc-
ture this information in our minds. A promising approach is
that of the linguist, Anna Wierzbicka.55 Wierzbicka defends the
toms were second and fourth on half of the cards and third and fifth on the other
half, with no statistical difference. See id.
51. For evidence that people are goal-oriented in their categorization decisions, see
Lawrence W. Barsalou, Deriving Categories to Achieve Goals, 27 PSYCHOL. LEARNING
& MOTIVATION 1 (1991).
52. See FRANK C. KEIL, CONCEPTS, KINDS, AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 59-82
(1992). For a sophisticated study that shows both the role of family resemblance and
its limits in the acquisition of categories by children, see ELLEN M. MARKMAN, CATE-
GORIZATION AND NAMING IN CHILDREN (1989).
53. See KEIL, supra note 52, at 59-82.
54. See, e.g., JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSsIBLE WORLDS 11-43 (1986). Of
course, it would be a mistake to reach conclusions about how we access and use
concepts from research on how we acquire concepts. These are separate issues. It
may well be, for example, that we typically use models based on prototypes even if
our conceptual knowledge also contains partial theories. See PHILIP N. JOHNSON-
LAIRD, MENTAL MODELS 205-42 (1983); Douglas L. Medin, Concepts and Conceptual
Structure, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 1469 (1989); Gregory L. Murphy, Theories and Concept
Formation, in CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS: THEORETICAL VIEWS AND INDUCTIVE DATA
ANALYSIS 173 (I. Van Mechelan et al. eds., 1993). In essence, this illustrates the
distinction between competence and performance developed by Chomsky. See
CHOMSKY, supra note 15, at 10-15.
55. For an overview of Wierzbicka's recent positions on these matters, see ANNA
WIERZBICKA, SEMANTICS: PRIMES AND UNIVERSALS (1996), and the many references
cited therein.
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notion that words do, indeed, have definitions." These defini-
tions, though, include descriptions of mental states that account
for prototype effects.57
To take an example that has been prominent in the literature,
the word "bachelor" once was thought to illustrate how words
can be broken down into their component meanings. "Bachelor"
had the features unmarried, adult, and male." As later theo-
rists demonstrated, however, there are many examples of un-
married adult males whom we are uncomfortable calling bache-
lors, such as the Pope, Tarzan, and homosexual men.59
Wierzbicka argues that we can remedy all of this if we include
in our definition of "bachelor," "a man thought of as a man who
can marry if he wants to."6" This has the desired consequence
of making "bachelor" subject to prototype effects, since our no-
tion of who is likely to marry is socially contingent and itself
fuzzy. It does not, however, improperly ignore our intuitions that
all bachelors are unmarried men. In other words, being unmar-
ried and being male are necessary, but not sufficient conditions
for bachelorhood. Within this framework, we similarly can define
rain as including not only "water falling from the sky," but also
something like, "when we think of rain, we think of getting wet."
This explains why we have trouble calling a light mist "rain,"
without losing the fact that only when water falls from the sky
do we say that it is raining.6 '
56. See id. at 237-57.
57. The expression "prototype effect" is that of George Lakoff. See GEORGE
LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND DANGEROUS THINGS 58 (1987). "Prototype effect" accurate-
ly captures the notion that prototypes are a consequence of the ways in which con-
cepts exist in our minds, but are not themselves sufficient to constitute a theory of
conceptualization.
58. See Jerrold J. Katz & Jerry A. Fodor, The Structure of a Semantic Theory, 39
LANGUAGE 170, 185-86 (1963).
59. Charles Fillmore first observed these issues in Towards a Descriptive Frame-
work for Spatial Deixis, in SPEECH, PLACE AND ACTION 31 (Robert J. Jarvella &
Wolfgang Klein eds., 1982).
60. WIERZBICKA, supra note 55, at 150. Wierzbicka criticizes Lakoffs approach. See
id. at 150-51. It appears, however, that the two approaches really are not incompati-
ble, although Wierzbicka's analysis is more detailed. See Winter, supra note 35, at
1382-86 (discussing adoption of Lakoffs approach).
61. Of course, there are metaphorical extensions of "rain," such as, "it is raining
money on Wall Street." The transitive use of "rain" flags this extension of the word.
Weather reports do not say "it is raining water." For a discussion of metaphor as a
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Philip Johnson-Laird's theory of mental models also acknowl-
edges the complexity of human conceptualization. Johnson-Laird
argues that reasoning in general involves the construction of
mental models, which we then compare to one another and ma-
nipulate." These models are subject to the prototype effects of
the sort discussed above.63 They also, however, contain conven-
tional dictionary entry information, as Johnson-Laird argues
from a set of ingenious recall experiments.'
It may be, then, that there really is no legitimate battle be-
tween classical theory and prototype theory. Rather, conceptual-
ization should be handled within a definitional approach that
includes reference to prototypical mental images, as well as to
things and events occurring in the world. From this, prototype
effects should reveal themselves naturally. If this approach is
correct, the problem with classical theory is not its reliance on
conditions, but rather its assumption that those conditions are
all "out there" in the world. Some of them, according to
Wierzbicka, are states of mind containing prototypical images.'
Sometimes, we can develop sophistication with our concepts
by gaining expertise. The zoologist knows a great deal about
elephants. She will have a much more elaborate theory of what
it is that makes an elephant an elephant, including many of
which the unschooled are not aware. She might make reference
significant phenomenon in conceptualization, see JEAN AITCHESON, WORDS IN THE
MIND 147-56 (2d ed. 1994); LAKOFF, supra note 57, at 7-8; Winter, supra note 35, at
1382-86.
62. See generally JOHNSON-LAIRD, supra note 54 (discussing mental models in
conceptualization and reasoning).
63. See id. at 192.
64. See id. at 229. Johnson-Laird reports on earlier-published experiments in
which subjects, given a category such as consumable solids, remembered items on a
list depending on how many features they had in common with the target category.
See Philip N. Johnson-Laird et al., Meaning, Amount of Processing, and Memory for
Words, 6 MEMORY & COGNITION 372, 374-75 (1978). In addition, the subjects had an
easier time recalling utensils relating to the target category depending on how many
features the utensil had in common with the target. See JOHNSON-LAIRD, supra note
54, at 228. For example, if the target category was "consumable solids" and the list
of words contained both "chicken" and "wine," subjects would be more likely to recall
"chicken." See id. at 227. Subjects were also, however, more likely to recall "plate"
than "cup." See id. at 228. It is difficult to explain this second result without re-
course to the kinds of features contained in conventional definitions. See id. at 229.
65. See WIERZBICKA, supra note 55, at 148-69.
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to, for example, differences between Asian and African ele-
phants, features in the paws, skin, gestation period, body tem-
perature, and so on-a few of which lay people might be relying
on unconsciously in forming their models, but which they cer-
tainly have no ability to discuss without significant training."
For most things that we encounter in the world, however,
there is no relevant expertise apart from everyday experience.
We form concepts from this experience and from the way we
structure it. Some concepts, like property, seem to have some
sufficient conditions (the right to exclude others),67 but no nec-
essary ones. In contrast, verbs expressing propositional attitude,
like doubt and believe, have the necessary condition of describing
mental states. Others, like odd number, appear to be definable
in terms of both necessary and sufficient conditions." Some-
times we have some necessary and sufficient conditions (ele-
phant-large mammal with trunk), but recognize that this
knowledge is woefully incomplete. Linguistic categories also vary
in this way. Recent work suggests that we learn irregular past
tense forms (e.g., shook, bought) individually and in family re-
semblance groups, but learn regular past tense forms (e.g., cre-
ated, moved, hiked) in an all-or-nothing fashion.69 Similarly,
66. For the perspective that our knowledge of concepts includes the notion that
our understanding is incomplete, but susceptible of further refinement based on what
we can learn from experts, see JERRY A. FODOR, THE ELM TREE AND THE EXPERT
(1994); Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of "Meaning," in LANGUAGE, MIND, AND KNOWL-
EDGE 131 (Keith Grunderson ed., 1975). For problems with reliance on expertise as
the basis for determining word meaning, see RAY JACKENDOFF, SEMANTICS AND COG-
NITION 93 (1983).
67. See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 373
(1954).
68. Interestingly, concepts like "odd number" still produce prototype effects. That
is, subjects are able to rank odd numbers as to whether they appear to be better or
worse examples. For example, three appears to be a better odd number than 23. See
Sharon Lee Armstrong et al., What Some Concepts Might Not Be, 13 COGNITION 263,
289 (1983). Rosch herself found that people rank different species of birds as better
or worse examples of the concept bird. Robins and Sparrows are prototypical but
peacocks and turkeys are not. See Rosch, supra note 29, at 232. Yet, no one would
argue seriously that peacocks and turkeys are not birds or that 23 is not an odd
number in an all or nothing sense. All of this implies that we appear to make prob-
ability assessments even when we make category decisions based on defining fea-
tures. For criticism of the approach taken by Armstrong and her colleagues, see
LAKOFF, supra note 57, at 148-51.
69. See Steven Pinker & Alan Prince, The Nature of Human Concepts: Evidence
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work on language processing reveals both all-or-nothing struc-
turally driven strategies, and more pragmatically oriented
construal.7 °
Crucially, our use of language is generally neutral with re-
spect to how broadly within the universe of possible interpreta-
tions we intend others to construe our words.7 The word "ve-
hicle" does not make it clear whether we are talking about the
prototypical vehicle in a given context, a crisply defined subset
of possible vehicles, or about anything within the outer limits of
our concept of vehicle. Language simply does not express all of
the richness of our conceptual structure.72 This linguistic neu-
trality facilitates thought. By assimilating new things and expe-
riences to existing categories, we are able to use old knowledge
to help us decide what to do in unfamiliar situations. We use
prototypes to idealize our experience, and then put these ide-
alizations to work in understanding the world.73 At the same
time, we search for properties of new things that we encounter
in the world that are sufficiently clear to put them into one or
another category with certainty. These are the defining features
and partial theories that continue to appear in the experimental
literature. In Wierzbicka's terms, they are the parts of defini-
tions that relate to things in the world other than to our own
states of mind. 4
Most of these issues are still the subject of intense investiga-
tion, and not everyone would agree with the above assessment of
where we stand now.75 Nonetheless, the reading of the litera-
from an Unusual Source, 29 COMM. & COGNITION 307, 312-30 (1996). For a discus-
sion of how linguistic categories generally are subject to prototype effects, see JOHN
R. TAYLOR, LNGUISTIC CATEGORIZATION: PROTOTYPES IN LINGUISTIC THEORY (2d ed.
1995).
70. See LYN FRAZIER & CHARLES CLIFTON, JR., CONSTRUAL 151-52 (1996).
71. See DENIS BOUCHARD, THE SEMANTICS OF SYNTAX 34 (1995).
72. For discussion, see RAY S. JACKENDOFF, THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE LANGUAGE
FACULTY 183-86 (1997). Jackendoff presents a sophisticated picture of how conceptual
structure and language interface.
73. Lakoffs terminology, "idealized cognitive models," describes this phenomenon
well. See LAKOFF, supra note 57, at 68-76.
74. See WIERZBICKA, supra note 55, at 149-69.
75. See, e.g., LAKOFF, supra note 57, at 68-76 (acknowledging the existence of
some all-or-nothing categories but focusing heavily on those aspects of cognition that
attempt to assimilate information to idealized cognitive models based almost exclu-
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ture adopted here suggests that we conceptualize in more than
one way. 6 If this perspective is right, it has important ramifi-
cations in the interpretation of statutes. It means that often we
will be unable to uncover in crisp rules referring to definable
conduct all of the "elements" of statutory categories, because
some of those elements are really aspects of our own internal
states of mind. That is how prototype effects arise. On the other
hand, the fact that we attempt to categorize by seeking defining
features, and sometimes manipulate idealized categories in ev-
eryday life as if they were all-or-nothing propositions, drives us
toward looking for ways to solve problems of categorization on
an all-or-nothing basis, even when it is not possible.
2. What is a Security?: A Legal Example
Before addressing recurring conceptual and linguistic prob-
lems that have led to the rule of lenity and other such substan-
tive canons of construction, let us look at an example of how or-
dinary statutory interpretation works with respect to the cogni-
tive processes described above.
The Securities Act of 1933 requires that securities be regis-
tered with the Securities and Exchange Commission before they
can be offered for sale to the public." The Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 outlaws fraud in the purchase or sale of securi-
ties.7" Under both statutes, it is necessary to determine in ad-
vance whether the instrument in dispute is a security, and is
therefore subject to the provisions of one of the acts. 9 Landreth
sively on family resemblance and prototypes). But see STEVEN PINKER, How THE
MIND WORKS 312 (1997) (agreeing with Lakoff with respect to concept formation, but
arguing that it is the very fact that we do form idealized models (i.e., prototypes)
that enables us to treat concepts as all-or-nothing propositions in everyday life, even
though we know better in some sense).
76. See supra notes 28-64 and accompanying text.
77. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994).
78. See id. § 78j.
79. The Securities Act of 1933 defines "security" as follows:
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebted-
ness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
ment, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate
of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
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Timber Co. v. Landreth80 presented the Supreme Court with
the issue of whether the sale of a family-owned lumber mill,
consummated as a sale of all of the stock in the company, came
within the securities statutes."' The mill had decreased in val-
ue as the result of a fire, but the owners did not inform the po-
tential investors adequately, including the party who later be-
came the actual buyer.82
The Supreme Court has held that noncontributory pension
plans' and shares in a housing cooperative, although called
"stock," are not securities,"4 but contracts to purchase as-
signments of oil leases are securities." At the time the Court
decided Landreth, most lower courts agreed that "the federal
securities laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a
closely held corporation."86 Moreover, the Supreme Court earli-
er had held that to determine whether an instrument should be
deemed stock, one should look not at whether it is called stock,
but rather at whether it has the core features of stock, such as
the right to receive dividends, negotiability, ability to pledge
them, voting rights in proportion to shares owned, and appre-
mineral rights . . . or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant
or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994).
80. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
81. See id. at 682-85.
82. See id.
83. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 553-57 (1979).
84. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 (1975).
85. See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 349 (1943); see also Ma-
rine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982) (holding that certificates of deposit
are not securities).
86. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 684. Lower courts had cited United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman as authority for this widely held proposition. See id. at 686. Forman,
however, said no such thing. Forman involved nontransferrable shares in a low-in-
come cooperative apartment complex. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 840-43. Ownership of
the shares included none of the usual benefits of stock ownership. See id. It merely
allowed the owner the right to lease a low-rent apartment. See id. Upon leaving the
apartment, the owner had to forfeit the shares, and would receive the $450 cost of
the shares in return, more or less the way a tenant obtains a refund of a security
deposit when moving out of an apartment. See id. at 840-43. Undoubtedly, the Court
decided Landreth to correct a perceived misreading of Forman to extend to the sale
of stock in closely held corporations.
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ciability.87 In essence, then, the Court had analyzed the concept
of a security as a family resemblance category, requiring that
the disputed item share at least some features with those con-
tained in the prototypical share of stock. This test required that
one look not at labels, but at the economic reality of the disput-
ed transaction.
In Landreth, however, the Court drew a conceptual line in the
sand. It distinguished all of the previously mentioned cases as
involving "unusual devices" and "unusual instruments."88 In
contrast,
the instrument involved [in Landreth] is traditional stock,
plainly within the statutory definition. There is no need here,
as there was in the prior cases, to look beyond the character-
istics of the instrument to determine whether the Acts apply.
Contrary to respondents' implication, th6 Court has never
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a
"security" simply because it is what it purports to be."
Justice Powell wrote the opinion in Landreth for a unanimous
Court. The structure of the argument comports well with the
picture of conceptualization outlined above. Powell regarded the
stock in the lumber company as the prototypical security. In an-
other context, Powell might have written, "I may need to consult
a zoologist to learn whether a fox is a member of the dog family,
but I sure know that my pet collie is a dog." And like our earlier
examples, the residual theory, used for cases outside the proto-
type, is incomplete. None of the factors considered in deciding
whether "an unusual instrument" is a security is both necessary
and sufficient. Rather, the Court is willing to call an instrument
a security when features tend to cluster around those that char-
acterize the prototype, such as corporate stock.
Not all cases fit so nicely into the description of concepts pro-
vided above. As we examine the differences between Landreth
and cases that approach these problems differently, however, we
87. See Fornan, 421 U.S. at 851.
88. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 688 ("unusual devices"), 689 ("unusual instrument"), 690
("unusual instruments").
89. Id. at 690-91.
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will see how we can reanalyze in cognitive and linguistic terms
battles over the way courts should interpret statutes.
3. Conceptual Problems in Statutory Construction
Most interpretive problems in law result from problems of
conceptualization. Some of the most prevalent issues facing the
interpreter of statutes are as follows:
(1) Vagueness-a statute refers to X, but we cannot tell
whether the disputed event is an X;
(2) Overinclusion-a statute refers to Y, we know that
the disputed event can be considered a Y, but it seems
wrong to do so here because whoever wrote the statute
probably meant Y in a narrower sense;
(3) Underinclusion-a statute refers to Z, we know that
the disputed event is not a Z, but we still feel that the stat-
ute should cover our situation because the disputed event is
like Z, and is just as blameworthy as Z.
This taxonomy accounts for many of what we consider to be
the hard cases of statutory interpretation." Numbers (1) and
(2) differ only by degree; (1) describes the problem of borderline
cases with a vague statute, whereas (2) describes a situation in
which the disputed event comes within the concept, but is re-
mote from the prototype. We are uncomfortable applying the
rule when this happens. Number (3) describes what happens
when we treat what appear to be similar situations differently
by outlawing only one of them. Moral values demanding equal
90. Legal scholars routinely recognize that rules tend to be overinclusive or
underinclusive. For a recent discussion, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING
AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 101-35 (1996). This description, however, is only partly
helpful. For example, statutes sometimes are overinclusive because they contain a
category that, if construed with unnatural breadth, would include the disputed con-
d.uct. On other occasions they appear to be overinclusive because they are ambigu-
ous, and a possible, but unintended reading of the statute would bring the disputed
conduct within the statute's scope. While the difference may seem subtle at first
glance, it accounts for what seem to be inconsistent and mutually contradictory
statements about the application of the rule of lenity over long expanses of time.
For an interesting discussion of interpretive problems associated with
overenforcement and underenforcement of statutes, see Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and
Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Underenforcement, Overenforcement,
and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 767 (1991).
[Vol. 40:57
LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LENITY
treatment for similar wrongs pressure us to expand the pro-
scribed category to include the equally bad conduct that does not
appear to be proscribed.
a. Vagueness and Overinclusion
Landreth illustrates how courts deal with vagueness. The
statute at issue in Landreth defined "security."91 Some instru-
ments, like the share certificates in Landreth itself, clearly fit
within the definition, but borderline cases remain. More difficult
is the interpretive problem that occurs when a statute, read lit-
erally, appears to criminalize more conduct than the legislature
in all likelihood intended. H.L.A. Hart confronted this problem
in his hypothetical rule forbidding vehicles in a park.92 Should
this rule make it illegal to drive an ambulance into the park? A
World War II tank that will be left there as a memorial? These
cases are distinct from cases of vagueness. When vagueness oc-
curs, as in the "rain" example, we cannot tell one way or the oth-
er whether the event or thing in question is a member of the
category contained in the statute. Here, in contrast, we know
perfectly well that ambulances, for example, are vehicles. The
problem is that the legislature that wrote the law might have
erred in using as broad a word as "vehicle" when it only intend-
ed to ban certain vehicles, i.e., those vehicles that typically irri-
tate those who are trying to enjoy the park.
A number of the most famous statutory cases confront this
problem. For example, in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States,93 a unanimous Supreme Court held that a statute mak-
ing it a crime, "in any manner whatsoever, to prepay the trans-
portation . . . of [an] alien . . . to perform labor or service of
any kind in the United States," did not apply to a church's pay-
ment for the transportation of its new rector from the United
Kingdom.' Justice Brewer first decided that "the act of the
91. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 685-86.
92. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 593, 607 (1958).
93. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
94. Id. at 458.
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corporation is within the letter of this section."95 Brewer deter-
mined, however, that this was not enough: "It is a familiar rule,
that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not
within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the
intention of its makers."96  Brewer concluded that the
transportation of the rector was not within the contemplation of
the legislature, notwithstanding the statute's broad language, in
part because
the thought expressed in this [i.e., the use of the word "labor"
in the statute's title] reaches only to the work of the manual
laborer, as distinguished from that of the professional man.
No one reading such a title would suppose that Congress had
in its mind any purpose of staying the coming into this coun-
try of ministers of the gospel, or, indeed, of any class whose
toil is that of the brain.97
Put in cognitive terms, Brewer hypothesized that the Con-
gress that enacted the statute had an evil in mind to thwart: the
importation of foreign workers by American employers bent on
obtaining cheap labor at the expense of both the American labor
market and the laborers themselves who would enter the coun-
try more or less as indentured servants. With this prototype in
mind, Congress enacted a statute, using a word, "labor," that
best characterizes the prototypical case. The conditions sufficient
for membership in the class of laborers extended beyond the
prototypical case. Brewer argued, therefore, that we should ig-
nore theoretical extensions of the concept that stray too far from
the prototype in deciding how broadly to interpret the statute.
Otherwise, the statute would be interpreted to outlaw conduct
that the enacting legislature would have believed to be entirely
proper.98
95. Id.
96. Id. at 459.
97. Id. at 463.
98. To put the discussion in Wierzbicka's framework, a psychologically realistic
definition of "laborer" would include the notion that "labor" makes us think of physi-
cal work. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. But see C. Adrian Vermeule,
- Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy
Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1857 (1998). Vermeule argues that a close
reading of related statutory language and legislative history argue against the Su-
preme Court's unanimous result. See id.
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McBoyle v. United States,9 the 1931 Supreme Court case
that inspired the "no vehicles in the park" debate between Hart
and Fuller,' shared this linguistic problem. Justice Holmes,
writing for a unanimous Court, refused to extend the National
Motor Vehicle Theft Act to include theft of an airplane.' ' The
Act defined "motor vehicle" to "include an automobile, automo-
bile truck, automobile wagon, motorcycle, or any other self-pro-
pelled vehicle not designed for running on rails.""2 Holmes
looked at legislative history (no mention of airplanes), looked at
related statutes (different treatment of airplanes), and applied
the principle of ejusdem generis (statutory list appears to in-
clude only land vehicles).'0 ' He concluded that airplanes should
not be considered vehicles for purposes of the statute. 4
Consistent with contemporary notions of word meaning,
Holmes stated: "But in everyday speech 'vehicle' calls up the
picture of a thing moving on land."' Holmes knew very well
that the statute referred to the theft of vehicles and that air-
planes are vehicles. Nonetheless, he rejected the definitional ap-
proach to word meaning"0 ' in favor of analyzing what Congress
seemed to have regarded as the prototype.' 7
99. 283 U.S. 25 (1931).
100. See Hart, supra note 92, at 606-15; Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to
Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). For an extremely
interesting analysis, see Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric
Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1172-98
(1989).
101. See McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 26-27.
102. National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, ch. 89, 41 Stat. 324 (1919) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 10, 2311-13 (1994)).
103. See McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 26-27.
104. See id.
105. McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 26.
106. "The definitional approach to word meaning" refers to the classic approach
that assumes that one can define concepts by necessary and sufficient conditions in
some objective, external sense. For an alternate view, see supra notes 55-61 and
accompanying text (discussing Wierzbecka's definitional approach, which incorporates
prototype effects into the definitions themselves).
107. For a discussion of this example in terms much like these, see Winter, supra
note 100, at 1176. Interestingly, as Winter has noted, Holmes was not consistent in
taking this position. In Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), Holmes reject-
ed a narrow interpretation of a statute that prohibited obstruction of "the recruiting
or enlistment service." Id. at 53. He noted that recruiting generally was accom-
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Even within the framework that Holmes embraced, one can
argue that he was wrong because he should have focused on the
current prototype at the time the Court decided the case, rather
than the prototype for the enacting legislature. That is, Holmes
should have recognized that had the enacting Congress been
sitting when he made his ruling, it would have had no trouble
incorporating airplanes into its "picture" of a vehicle.108 The
purpose of this discussion is not to defend the result in McBoyle,
but to point out the significanc.e of its analytical structure.
Smith v. United States..9 is a more recent illustration of this
phenomenon. In Smith, the Supreme Court debated whether the
expression "use a gun" should be interpreted to include trading a
gun for cocaine, as Justice O'Connor argued for the majority, or
to include only using a gun as a weapon, as Justice Scalia pro-
posed in dissent."' Stretched to its conceptual boundaries, the
statute can mean just what the majority said it means. Like the
rector and the airplane, however, the person who attempts to
trade a machine gun for cocaine seems to be outside the scope of
what the legislature intended the statute to address. Unlike
Brewer and Holmes, O'Connor chose in Smith to place the theo-
ry of the concept above its prototype in making the decision.
Interestingly, in his recent book, Justice Scalia criticizes the
majority decision in Smith for straying too far from ordinary
meaning."' Scalia also, however, offers sharp criticism of Holy
plished by getting volunteers, and that "the word is apt to call up that method only
in our minds." Id. Nonetheless, he extended the concept of recruiting to incorporate
the military draft. See id.
108. For a lengthy defense of this approach to statutory interpretation, see WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); Lawrence Lessig,
Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). For a more recent McBoyle
problem, see Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990). The statute at issue in
Moskal, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994), prohibited the interstate transportation of, among
other things, "falsely made" securities, including washed automobile titles. See
Moskal, 498 U.S. at 106. The defendant argued that "falsely made," when the legis-
lature enacted the statute, meant "counterfeit." See id. at 106-07. The court deter-
mined that "falsely made" had, at the time the Court heard the case, a plain mean-
ing sufficient to put any defendant on notice. See id. at 108-15. Justice Scalia's dis-
sent, however, resembles Holmes's arguments in McBoyle. For a further discussion of
Moskal, see infra notes 377-84 and accompanying text.
109. 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
110. See id. at 228-37. For a more detailed discussion of this case, see Solan, supra
note 27, at 270-75.
111. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
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Trinity Church, largely because of its reliance on the spirit of
the statute."1 These criticisms are ironic. Scalia's dissent in
Smith is very much like Brewer's majority opinion in Holy Trini-
ty Church. Both opinions reject resort to the outer bounds of
definitions, relying instead on the "ordinary meaning," i.e.,
prototypical meaning, of the statute.
b. Underinclusion and the Linguistic Wall
The third conceptual problem that courts regularly face is the
problem of apparent underinclusion. A statute, read literally,
sometimes proscribes certain behavior, but does not cover simi-
lar behavior that seems just as culpable. This can be the result
of legislative compromise, difficulties in defining categories, or
just plain sloppy drafting. When this happens, prosecutors fre-
quently ask the courts to extend the scope of the statute to in-
clude the equally culpable conduct. In a sense, this position is
very reasonable. Our intuitions about justice tell us that the law
should treat similar conduct similarly."' If two people do more
or less the same thing, why should one be convicted of a serious
crime, while the other is exonerated completely?
Despite the force of this argument, the traditional rule, first
espoused by Chief Justice Marshall in United States v.
Wiltberger,"4 is that courts should not look beyond the lan-
guage of a statute to expand its scope to all occurrences involv-
ing the same evil as the conduct that the statute proscribes." 5
This rule is in keeping with both the due process and separation
of powers rationales that pervade discussion of the proper inter-
pretation of criminal statutes."' If the legislature did not
THE LAW 18-23 (1997).
112. See id.
113. For example, the Guidelines Manual of the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion describes "reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity
in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders" as
one of the three objectives that Congress sought to achieve in enacting the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act of 1984. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2 (1995).
114. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820).
115. See id. at 96. See infra notes 146-58 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Wiltberger.
116. See, e.g., McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (discussing due
process); Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 95 (discussing separation of powers).
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criminalize a defendant's conduct, then the defendant has not
received notice that his conduct could lead to punishment."' It
would be unfair to the accused, and disrespectful to the struc-
ture of our government, for the courts to criminalize conduct
that the legislature has not proscribed." 8
For the most part, courts adhere to this principle. For exam-
ple, the provisions of the securities laws discussed above apply
only to sales of securities. Frauds involving instruments that are
not securities are just as bad for the victims as those involving
instruments that are securities. The Court, though, has never
attempted to extend the reach of the securities laws on that ba-
sis. This might induce a court to interpret the term "security"
rather broadly, as courts seem to do. No court, however, has
been willing to dispense with the analysis altogether. When
something is plainly outside the scope of a statute's proscription,
we do not read it into the statute simply because the evil is both
similar to and just as bad as the evil that the statute actually
addresses. This Article refers to this phenomenon as "the lin-
guistic wall."
The linguistic wall flies in the face of the competing value
that the law should deal with similaily bad behavior similarly; it
sometimes is tempting for a court to pretend that an evil is
within the bounds of a statute when it really is not. This move
nominally preserves the appearance of legislative primacy, and
at the same time treats comparably those who commit similar
bad acts. Some of the more aggressive constructions of the feder-
al mail fraud statute by the Supreme Court fit well into this
category."' Courts also typically interpret rather broadly other
117. See, e.g., McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 27.
118. See, e.g., Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 96.
119. In Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989), the defendant was accused
of setting back odometers in Wisconsin, and then selling the cars for inflated prices
to car dealers. See id. at 707. The dealers, in turn, innocently resold the cars for
more than they were worth to their own customers. See id. Schmuck obviously had
committed a fraud. The issue was whether Schmuck used the mail "for the purpose
of executing such scheme or artifice." 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994). The government's on-
ly proof on this issue was the dealers' subsequent mailings of the registration forms
to the Wisconsin motor vehicle bureau. See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 707-08. The state
authorities had not prosecuted Schmuck. Therefore, failure to prove this jurisdic-
tional fact would have resulted in his getting away with serious fraud. A divided
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statutes that federalize crimes that would otherwise be criminal
under state law.'
There are many reasons that a statute might outlaw one kind
of evil, but leave a similar evil unregulated. The simplest an-
swer is that Congress might have intended to do so. That is cer-
tainly the general wisdom behind interpreting the securities
laws to include only fraud involving securities, and is at the
heart of most theories of the legislative process, especially public
choice theory.'2' At times, however, like the rest of us, congres-
sional drafters miss something. The words they use understate
the concepts they attempt to denote. By focusing too heavily on
the prototypical instances, Congress chooses words the theoreti-
cal extensions of which are still too narrow to express its
thoughts. Of course, we cannot ordinarily tell with certainty
when this has happened. That is why we invoke the linguistic
wall. We do, however, share the intuition that it does happen.
After all, it happens to all of us. It is this interpretive context
that has put the most pressure on lenity and related principles
of interpretation.
Significantly, linguistic wall cases are about neither ambiguity
nor vagueness. Precisely because the legislature has spoken
clearly, courts give the statutory words deference in these cases.
Still, linguistic wall cases are about conceptualization. The
words of the statutes may be clear on their face, but we have the
Supreme Court held that the bureau's mailings were sufficient, because "[a] rational
jury could have concluded that the success of Schmuck's venture depended upon his
continued harmonious relations with, and good reputation among, retail dealers,
which in turn required the smooth flow of cars from the dealers to their Wisconsin
customers." Id. at 711-12. As Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent, however, the
fraud was already over by the time the mailing occurred. See id. at 723 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). This decision is very difficult to justify within the bounds of the linguis-
tic wall.
120. See Moskai v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 105 (1990). Kahan argues that
such facts constitute evidence that the rule of lenity is obsolete. See Kahan, supra
note 4, at 388-89. Section IV of this Article discusses my reasons for disagreeing
with Kahan's argument.
121. See West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) ("As we have
observed before, however, the purpose of a statute includes not only what it sets out
to change, but also what it resolves to leave alone."). For a discussion of various ap-
proaches, see DANIEL A. FARBER AND PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE
(1991).
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intuition that the clarity is in part the result of the legislature
having chosen, perhaps by error, concepts that do not include all
of the events that they should. We would like to correct this
problem but the linguistic wall says that we should not do so.
C. Summary
This Article has distinguished between linguistic ambiguity
and problems of conceptualization. 22 Some problems of statu-
tory construction do involve ambiguity, but most do not. Rather,
they involve conceptual difficulties. Some categories are
overinclusive, and others are underinclusive. Because these
problems follow directly from the way that we form concepts,
virtually all legal categories will suffer from them. Consequent-
ly, we must decide what to do when they arise.
II. THREE APPROACHES TO INTERPRETING CRIMINAL STATUTES:
A COGNITIVELY DRIVEN HISTORY
This section describes the process by which the rules govern-
ing the interpretation of criminal statutes have changed over the
years. The rule of lenity has by and large remained in force, but
it has shrunk. This shrinking is the natural consequence of
American courts' acceptance of extratextual information, such as
legislative history, into the interpretive process in the early
decades of this century. Using the framework developed above,
this section argues that the narrow version is sufficient to meet
the concerns that motivate the rule.
122. In keeping with the discussion thus far, the line between ambiguity and
vagueness is not always crisp when it comes to disputes over word meanings. That
is, "bank" presents a prototypical case of lexical ambiguity. When the possible mean-
ings of a word are more closely related, however, it becomes more difficult to decide
whether we are dealing with distinct meanings altogether, i.e., ambiguity, or the fit
between events and a set of closely related concepts, i.e., vagueness. Different senses
of the word "light" (to ignite a cigarette or something used to illuminate) illustrate
the point. A "light" in the first sense actually creates "light" in the second. This
does not pose a problem for the structure of the proposed analysis. It merely means
that there will be cases that are inherently difficult to analyze-which should not be
surprising.
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A. Naked Lenity
The rule that criminal statutes should be strictly construed
developed in England in response to a legal regime that pun-
ished just about every crime by hanging." Government not
having invested in prisons, punishment in seventeenth century
England varied between transportation to the colonies and capi-
tal punishment, with the latter inflicted liberally.' A common
law defense to many such crimes, "benefit of the clergy," granted
immunity to prosecution to those who could read portions of the
Bible.' With the rise in literacy, more defendants who were
not members of the clergy qualified for this defense.' In re-
sponse, the legislature exempted more and more crimes from the
benefit of the clergy defense, leading to a "march to the gal-
lows."'27 The courts, doing what they could to frustrate the leg-
islative will, developed the principle that penal statutes were to
be construed strictly, a principle that was firmly in place by the
time of the founding of the United States.2 8
Blackstone's illustrations show the extent of this phenomenon.
About one case, he wrote:
Thus the statute 1 Edw. VI. having enacted that those who
are convicted of stealing horses should not have the benefit of
clergy, the judges conceived that this did not extend to him
that should steal but one horse, and therefore procured a new
act for that purpose in the following year."
123. For a seminal piece that discusses this history, see Hall, supra note 4, at 749-
50. See also Davies, supra note "7, at 1177-78 (discussing history of interpretation of
criminal statutes in England); Note, The Mercy of Scalia: Statutory Construction and
the Rule of Lenity, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 199-200 (1994) (discussing the
history of interpretation of criminal statutes in England).
124. See Gray Cavendar & Michael C. Musheno, The Adoption and Implementation
of Determinate Based Sanctioning Policies: A Critical Perspective, 17 GA. L. REV. 425,
431 (1983).
125. Some interesting aspects of this defense are described in J. H. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 586-89 (3d ed. 1990).
126. See Hall, supra note 4, at 749.
127. Note, supra note 123, at 200.
128. See id.
129. 1 WILL.i BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *88.
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Blackstone's other illustration concerned a statute that
criminalized "stealing sheep or other cattle."l"' The court deter-
mined that the general words "or other cattle" were "much too
loose to create a capital offence, and the act was held to extend
to nothing but mere sheep."131
Linguistically, these cases illustrate what happens when a
court refuses to use context to resolve ambiguity and vagueness.
Blackstone's first illustration involves an ambiguous statute.
The expression "those who steal horses shall be punished" is
ambiguous with respect to how many horses an individual must
steal to be punished. It can mean the following: for all x, if x
steals n horse(s), n >_ 1, then x shall be punished. It also can
mean for all x, if x steals horses, then x shall be punished. In the
first reading, horse appears in the plural only to agree in num-
ber with those. In the second, its number carries semantic infor-
mation. The legislature that enacted this statute almost certain-
ly intended the first reading, but the second remains possible.
The second illustration involves vagueness. Once we establish
sheep as prototypical cattle, as the statute does, what else
should count as cattle for purposes of interpreting the statute? If
a court were to look out of context at the outer boundaries of the
concept cattle, i.e., if the court were to use a theory of what con-
stitutes cattle, the answer at the least would include cows. If the
court were to look at animals that resemble sheep, the answer is
not clear. The legislature no doubt intended to include sheep
and any other animal that grazed on English farms at that time.
The English court, however, took advantage of the legislature's
identification of sheep as the prototype for purposes of the stat-
ute, limiting its interpretation to animals that closely resemble
the prototypical example contained in the statute.
Our courts do not subscribe to naked lenity. Nonetheless, we
should not forget that the strict construction of penal statutes
came into play when a judiciary disapproved of legislative harsh-
130. Id.
131. Id. Blackstone continues by describing the next move in this chess game be-
tween legislature and court: "And therefore, in the next sessions, it was found neces-
sary to make another statute, 15 Geo. II. c. 34. extending the former to bulls, cows,
oxen, steers, bullocks, heifers, calves, and lambs, by name." Id.
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ness it regarded as cruel."3 2 Thus, it used lenity to thwart, not
promote, the will of the legislature. 3 Whether the statute
underdetermined meaning because it was vague or ambiguous
made no difference. The notion that a defendant is entitled to
clear notice is an ancient justification. The rule's separation of
powers justification, however, is at odds with its common law
roots.'34
B. The American Tradition of Strict Construction
1. Chief Justice Marshall and Legislative Primacy
The question of lenity arose early in this country's history. In
1805, in United States v. Fisher,'35 Chief Justice Marshall ar-
ticulated the rule that "where great inconvenience will result
from a particular construction, that construction is to be avoid-
ed, unless the meaning of the legislature be plain; in which case
it must be obeyed.""3 6 Fisher was a civil case. Section 5 of the
Bankruptcy Act gave priority to the United States over other
creditors, "where any revenue officer, or other person, hereafter
becoming indebted to the United States, by bond or otherwise,
shall become insolvent.""7 The issue in Fisher was whether the
United States had priority when the insolvent was not a gov-
ernment official."' Although the phrase "or other-person" need
not be so construed, the creditor whose interest was at stake
132. See Note, supra note 123, at 200.
133. See id.
134. In fact, there were common law crimes in seventeenth century England. For a
discussion of the rejection of common law crimes in the United States, see R. KENT
NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUB-
LIC 100-06 (1985). Professor Kahan takes the position that courts never really elimi-
nated common law crimes. See Kahan, supra note 4, at 347. In modem times,
Kahan argues, the shared lawmaking role of legislature and court takes its form in
the legislature's delegation of the interpretation of complicated statutes in unforeseen
situations. See id. I agree with Kahan on this issue, but disagree with his broader
inference that shared lawmaking power undermines the rationales underlying lenity,
making it unnecessary.
135. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805).
136. Id. at 386.
137. Id. at 385.
138. See id. at 358.
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argued that "or any person" should be read in light of "any reve-
nue officer" to refer only to government officials."'
Marshall disagreed. Engaging in close textual analysis, he
considered seriously, but ultimately rejected, a host of argu-
ments based on surrounding statutory language and subsequent-
ly enacted statutes. Among them was the defendant's argument
that "any person" should be read to include only government
officials. 40 The bottom line to Marshall was that the language
of the statute was plain enough. He reached this conclusion
notwithstanding the potential inferences to the contrary, which
at the very least gave him enough pause to devote pages of
lengthy analysis. As for lenity, Marshall qualified his earlier
statement that strict construction should be the rule where
"great inconvenience will result," holding that it did not apply to
regulatory statutes like the Bankruptcy Act-but only to stat-
utes that infringed on more fundamental rights.'
Fisher is most famous for its oft-quoted statement: "Where the
mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes
everything from which aid can be derived."42 Marshall most
likely did not intend that this be construed as broadly as we
now do. The opinion does not even mention legislative history,
which was outside the legitimate consideration of the English
courts, where it remained until very recently."4 By "everything
from which aid can be derived," Marshall no doubt intended the
gloss, "among those things that our jurisprudence permits us to
consider."' 4 Marshall was, by and large, a textualist, "5 and
139. This is the canon ejusdem generis. Marshall wrote: "Wherever general words
have been used in these sections, they are restrained by the subject to which they
relate, and by other words frequently in the same sentence, to particular objects, so
as to make it apparent that they were employed by the legislature in a limited
sense." Id. at 387.
140. See id. at 385-97.
141. See id. at 390.
142. Id. at 386.
143. See Miller v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2332 (1769) (holding that the sense and
meaning of an act of Parliament must be collected from what it says when passed
into law, and not from the history of changes it underwent in the house where it
took its rise; that history is not known to the other house or to the sovereign). For
a recent case relaxing the English rule, see Pepper v. Hart, 3 W.L.R. 1032 (1993).
144. Of course, we understand the statement this way as well. What has changed
with respect to our understanding of Marshall's statement, at least for most of the
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his reluctance to step away from statutory language subsequent-
ly had serious ramifications for how he viewed lenity.
Fifteen years after Fisher, in United States v. Wiltberger,146
Marshall did wrestle with the tension between legislative intent
and lenity, this time in a criminal case. The issue in Wiltberger
was whether the federal courts had jurisdiction over a prosecu-
tion for manslaughter, in which the homicide had occurred on an
American merchant marine vessel located on the Tigris River in
China. 7 Section 12 of the 1790 Act in dispute criminalized
manslaughter "upon the high seas" for purposes of federal juris-
diction. "' The question was whether this should be construed
as including rivers in foreign countries." 9
The government's principal argument was that section 8 of
the Act gave the courts jurisdiction over prosecutions for robbery
committed "upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or
bay." 50 It only made sense, the argument continued, to con-
clude that Congress used the expression "high seas" in section
12 as a shorthand for the collection of bodies of water described
in section 8.'
Wiltberger, then, required the Court to determine whether it
should expand the language of a criminal statute to include a
class of defendants whom a reasonable legislature in all likeli-
hood would have wished to include. Marshall answered this
question negatively, thus establishing the linguistic wall. 5 ' He
judiciary, is the identity of what it is permissible to consult. Thus, we still do not
interpret Marshall's words to mean that court officials should break into the private
offices of legislators and steal their files, an act that could provide insights into why
the legislature drafted a statute as it did.
145. For a discussion of Marshall's position on issues concerning statutory interpre-
tation, see John Choon Yoo, Note, Marshall's Plan: The Early Supreme Court and
Statutory Interpretation, 101 YALE L.J. 1607, 1615-17 (1992). For a discussion of
textualism as a method of statutory interpretation, see, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Interve-
nor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 621-23 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Solan, supra note
27.
146. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820).
147. See id. at 77.
148. See id. at 80-81.
149. See id. at 94.
150. Id. at 79.
151. See id. at 94-95.
152. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text for a definition of the linguistic
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did not limit himself solely to that issue, however. Rather, he
used Wiltberger as a vehicle to discuss the entire array of inter-
pretive problems described in the preceding section of this Arti-
cle. First, Marshall stated with elegance the rule of lenity and
its motivations:
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is per-
haps not much less old than construction itself. It is founded
on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and
on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested
in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the leg-
islature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain
its punishment.'53
But Marshall then continued:
It is said, that notwithstanding this rule, the intention of the
law maker must govern in the construction of penal, as well
as other statutes. This is true. But this is not a new indepen-
dent rule which subverts the old. It is a modification of the
ancient maxim, and amounts to this, that though penal laws
are to be construed strictly, they are not to be construed so
strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature.
The maxim is not to be so applied as to narrow the words of
the statute to the exclusion of cases which those words, in
their ordinary acceptation, or in that sense in which the
legislature has obviously used them, would comprehend."M
Marshall's words on avoidance of narrow interpretation of a
statute are dicta. Wiltberger had no issue that involved inter-
preting any expression with unnatural narrowness. Marshall's
caveat nonetheless demonstrates a high level of sophistication.
In it, he recognized that statutory terms become vague at the
margins. Marshall wanted to make sure that his opinions would
not lead once again to judicial findings that cows are not cattle.
To discern the intent of the legislature, we look at the words
"in their ordinary acceptation, or in that sense in which the
legislature has obviously used them."155 That is, we draw the
wall.
153. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 95.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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inference that the legislature has used statutory words in their
prototypical sense. In Wiltberger, inquiry into such matters left
Marshall with only a single choice. After all, rivers are not the
high seas.'56 As far as Marshall was concerned, then, the stat-
ute really presented no interpretive problem. It was simply a
narrowly-drafted law:
To determine that a case is within the intention of a statute,
its language must authorize us to say so. It would be danger-
ous, indeed, to carry the principle, that a case which is with-
in the reason or mischief of a statute, is within its provisions,
so far as to punish a crime not enumerated in the statute,
because it is of equal atrocity, or of kindred character, with
those which are enumerated.157
Marshall's concern was that courts not engage in creating a
common law of crimes based on inferences that go beyond the
language actually contained in the statute. At the end of the
opinion he wrote:
It appears that the argument chiefly relied on, to prove that
the words of one section descriptive of the place ought to be
incorporated into another, is the extreme improbability that
Congress could have intended to make those differences with
respect to place, which their words import. We admit that it
is extremely improbable. But probability is not a guide which
a court, in construing a penal statute, can safely take. We
can conceive no reason why other crimes which are not com-
prehended in this act, should not be punished. But Congress
has not made them punishable, and this Court cannot en-
large the statute."8
156. See id. at 94.
157. Id. at 96.
158. Id. at 105. For another example of this principle, see United States v.
Sheldon, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 119 (1817). In Sheldon, the Court refused to extend a
statute making it illegal to transport munitions or provisions from the United States
to Canada "in any waggon, cart, sleigh, boat, or otherwise," to include living oxen
driven over the Canadian border. Id. at 120 (emphasis added). The Court construed
.otherwise" as limited to the kinds of vehicles enumerated in the statute. See id. at
121. The Court admitted that "the mischief is the same, whether the enemy be
supplied with provisions in the one way or the other," but refused to interpret the
statute as addressing this evil without clear language from Congress supporting such
a move. Id.
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Although not technically a lenity case because the language of
the statute was sufficiently clear, Wiltberger served as a vehicle
for Chief Justice Marshall to espouse a set of related principles
for interpreting criminal statutes: (1) criminal statutes are to be
strictly construed; (2) vagueness is not to be resolved by impos-
ing the narrowest reading; rather, the ordinary meaning of the
word is to be gleaned from its context in the statute; and (3) if
an activity is not within the plain meaning of the statute, it is
not a crime. These rules correspond to the linguistic and concep-
tual problems outlined in the preceding section of this Article,
but only the third of these problems actually arose in Wiltberger.
To see early examples of the others, we turn to opinions of Jus-
tice Story.
2. Justice Story and the Meaning of Words
Neither Marshall opinion discussed above dealt with the kinds
of conceptual problems discussed earlier, but two opinions writ-
ten by Justice Story, sitting as Circuit Justice, did. In United
States v. Shackford,'59 decided in 1830, the question concerned
the meaning of the word "arrival." The Coasting Act of 1793
provided for the issuance of temporary registry to a ship by the
collector of a district other than that of the ship's home port.16°
Section 3 of the Act imposed a fine for failing to deliver the
temporary registry within ten days of the ship's "arrival" in the
home port. 6' At issue in Shackford was whether a ship that
briefly entered its home port in the course of a journey had "ar-
rived" in its home port, and therefore was obliged to deliver the
temporary registries.6 2 In this respect, the statute was vague.
Story began his analysis by candidly admitting that the lan-
guage of the statute underdetermined its meaning. 3 He in-
voked the rule of lenity, not as a rule of decision, but rather as a
guide to a judge attempting to ascertain how broadly the legisla-
ture intended the word to be construed:
159. 27 F. Cas. 1038 (C.C.D. Me. 1830) (No. 16,262).
160. See id. at 1038.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
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But if one construction be exceedingly inconvenient, and the
other safe and convenient, a fortiori ought the latter to be
deemed the true exposition of the legislative intention; for it
can never be presumed that the government means to impose
irksome regulations, unless for some known object, or from
some express declaration."M
Looking to the language of both the statute in question and
related provisions, Story concluded that imposing a fine on a
vessel that makes only a brief visit to its home port would not
serve the purpose of the statute.'65 Differing slightly from Mar-
shall in his formulation of the rule, Story looked not to the ordi-
nary meaning of "arrival" in some generic sense, but rather to
the meaning that the legislature more likely intended in light of
what the text said about the purpose of the statute.
In United States v. Winn,'66 an 1838 case that involved a
statute making it 'unlawful for "any master or other officer" of
an American ship to unjustifiably beat, wound, or imprison "any
one or more of the crew of such ship,""' Story used Marshall's
exact approach in refusing to apply the rule of lenity. The defen-
dant, master of a ship, had been convicted of unjustifiably im-
prisoning the ship's chief officer.'68 The issue was whether the
chief officer should be considered among the "crew" of the
ship.'69 Story acknowledged the rule of lenity, but added:
I agree to that rule in its true and sober sense; and that is,
that penal statutes are not to be enlarged by implication, or
extended to cases not obviously within their words and pur-
port. But where the words are general, and include various
classes of persons, I know of no authority, which would justi-
fy the court in restricting them to one class, or in giving them
the narrowest interpretation, where the mischief to be re-
dressed by the statute is equally applicable to all of them. 7
164. Id. at 1039.
165. See id. at 1039-40.
166. 28 F. Cas. 733 (C.C.D. Mass. 1838) (No. 16,740).
167. Id. at 733.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 734.
170. Id.
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He then proceeded to determine that the word "crew," in its
"general and popular sense," meant the ship's company. 17' To
reach this conclusion, Story referred to various dictionaries and
to other provisions in the United States Code that used the word
"crew," much the way the Supreme Court has determined the
appropriate meanings of words in recent years. 72 Story found
that statutes generally used the word "crew" to refer to the en-
tire company on a ship. 73 Statutes that used the word more
narrowly usually drew a distinction by referring separately to
the officers and the crew. 74
Turning to the purpose of the statute, Story then asked rhe-
torically: "Why should we resort to the narrowest possible sense
of the words, instead of the general sense, if there is the same
mischief in each case to be suppressed, and the same public poli-
cy in the protection of the commercial interests of the coun-
try?" 75 Combining analyses of the ordinary meaning of the
word in dispute, its use in the United States Code, and the pur-
pose of the statute, Story concluded that the rule of lenity
should not apply, and let the conviction stand.
17
This method of interpreting criminal statutes remained in
place as the principal mode of analysis through the nineteenth
century.177 Courts interpreted criminal statutes narrowly
(without using the word "lenity"), but to the extent that the
dispute was over the meaning of a statutory word, limited inves-
tigation occurred into the legislature's intended meaning of that
word. 78 Such investigation into legislative intent often did not
include analysis of legislative history, but came to do so only
over time.
171. Id.
172. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-29, 231-32 (1993), discussed
supra text accompanying notes 109-12.
173. See Winn, 28 F. Cas. at 735.
174. See id. at 734-35.
175. Id. at 735.
176. See id. at 734-37.
177. See Note, supra note 123, at 201-02.
178. See id. at 201-05.
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C. Narrowing the Rule of Lenity
1. A Shift in the Interpretive Culture
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,'79 the 1892 deci-
sion holding that a rector is not a laborer, also is noteworthy for
its use of legislative history as justification for a narrow inter-
pretation of the statute. Repeating Marshall's famous pro-
nouncement in United States v. Fisher,8 ° Justice Brewer did
not limit himself to the statutory text as Marshall had done
before him, but wrote extensively about the report of the Senate
Committee on Education and Labor. The report made it clear
that the Committee was aware of the possibility that one might
interpret the statute broadly to prohibit assisting clergy to im-
migrate, but that the intent of the statute was for the courts not
to do this.'8 '
Brewer's reliance on legislative history was by no means revo-
lutionary. The Court had used it occasionally in statutory cases
during the nineteenth century, but such cases were not com-
mon.'82 Thus, Church of the Holy Trinity presaged a gradual
change in the Supreme Court's methodology. In 1897, for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court referred to legislative history in inter-
preting the newly enacted Sherman Antitrust Act, a statute that
contained so few words of such broad generality that it would be
almost impossible to interpret it meaningfully without resource
to contextual material outside the language of the act itself. 83
179. 143 U.S. 457 (1892), discussed supra text accompanying notes 93-98.
180. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) ("Where the mind labours to discover the
design of the . . . legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derive.").
181. See Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 464-65. In his engaging article on
Church of the Holy Trinity, Verneule argues that the legislative history was not as
clear as Brewer made it seem. See Vermeule, supra note 98, at 1839-57. Vermeule
blames the lawyers in part for bringing a distorted picture of the legislative history
to the Court's attention. See id. at 1858.
182. See, e.g., Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1878); Blake v. National
Banks, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 307, 317 (1874); Dubuque and Pacific R.R. v. Litchfield, 64
U.S. (23 How.) 66, 87 (1859); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54
U.S. (13 How.) 518, 565 (1851). For a discussion of the use of legislative history in
early cases, see James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpreta-
tions of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 44-45
(1994); Mark R. Killenbeck, A Matter of Mere Approval? The Role of the President in
the Creation of Legislative History, 48 ARK. L. REV. 239, 257-58 (1995).
183. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 321 (1897).
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The cause of this shift in focus is a matter of some specula-
tion. Eskridge, for example, places considerable weight on the
reaction to Church of the Holy Trinity." He points out that
just prior to the decision, the first edition of Sutherland's trea-
tise on the interpretation of statutes gave no role to the use of
legislative history in statutory interpretation. 85 In contrast,
the second edition of Sutherland, published in 1904, contained
extensive discussion of the propriety of using extrinsic evidence
of legislative intent gleaned from congressional proceedings. 8 '
Moreover, Eskridge and other commentators attribute this
change in interpretive culture to a shift in the nature of the kind
of legislation that Congress began enacting at the turn of the
century: "New regulatory statutes even sought to move policy
beyond or against common law doctrines. Without the common
law to guide interpretation in such statutes, legislative history
emerged as another useful context for interpretation." s7
While these views help to explain the historical record, they
do not tell the entire story. For example, the Interstate Com-
merce Act.. was enacted in 1887. As set forth in Table 1, the
Supreme Court decided eleven cases interpreting the Act in the
1890's. It refrained from resorting to legislative history in all of
these decisions.'89
This is not to imply that the legislative history of the Sherman Act teaches us much
about how to interpret it. For a discussion of that history, see Spencer Weber
Waller, Market Talk, 22 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 435 (1997) (book review).
184. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 108, at 209.
185. See id. at 208; J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
380 (1891).
186. See J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 879-83 (2d ed.
1904).
187. ESKRIDGE, supra note 108, at 209; see Brudney, supra note 182, at 45 n.178.
188. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
189. In one of these cases, Texas & Pacific Railway v. ICC, 162 U.S. 197 (1896),
the Court did state that "courts must take notice of the history of legislation,"
among other things, in deciding which construction of a statute to accept. Id. at 218.
It does not appear, however, that the Court actually looked at the legislative process
in deciding that particular case. In none of the other 10 cases did the Court men-
tion the issue at all.
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TABLE 1
SUPREME COURT CASES
INTERPRETING INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT
DECADE CASES INTERPRETING INTERSTATE CASES INTERPRETING INTERSTATE
COMMERCE ACT COMMERCE AT THAT RELY ON
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
1890s 11 0
1930s 57 21
This should not be terribly surprising. The textualist culture had
been part of the Court since before John Marshall's time; regula-
tory statutes requiring more attention to legislative goals were
just beginning to proliferate; and Church of the Holy Trinity,
however notorious, was just one case. In contrast, during the
1930s, the Court decided fifty-seven cases interpreting the same
act, indicating that the Court indeed was devoting more of its
energy to the interpretation of regulatory statutes. In that de-
cade, the Court resorted to legislative history twenty-one times,
or thirty-seven percent of the time. Although Congress amended
the Act during the interim, it seems fair to attribute the use of
this new rhetoric to a change in interpretive culture. 90
A more general study of cases that mention various aspects of
the legislative process shows the same phenomenon during the
period spanning 1890 through 1939, when Felix Frankfurter was
appointed to the Court. Although treatise writers changed their
positions on this issue at the turn of the century, and counsel
arguing before the Court quickly followed suit, the Court itself
only gradually became comfortable referring to legislative histo-
ry in its opinions. Table 2 sets forth a decade by decade tally of
instances in which the Court used legislative history in its opin-
ions, as well as instances in which counsel referred to it, but the
Court did not.19'
190. For an interesting argument that the Erie doctrine became increasingly likely
as the result of cultural change, rather than as a sterile reevaluation of old doctrine,
see Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive
Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1997).
191. The data contained in the chart reflect the results of a LEXIS search for the
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TABLE 2
THE SUPREME COURT'S USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
1890 - 1939
DECADE CASES CONTAINING REFERENCE CASES CONTAINING REFERENCE
TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
BY THE COURT BY COUNSEL ONLY
1890-1899 3 15
1900-1909 8 14
1910-1919 46 34
1920-1929 60 32
1930-1939 154 23
As Table 2 demonstrates, the Court was slow to embrace the
examination of legislative history as part of its routine method-
ology, and only came to do so during the New Deal. Prior to the
New Deal, reference to legislative history became more common,
with some significant cases resorting to it, 9 ' but it was still
not the norm.
The early decades of the twentieth century were a time of
transition in the realm of statutory interpretation, just as they
were a time of transition in so many substantive areas of
time period in question with the following words: "legislative history or conference
report or senate committee or senate report or house committee or house report or
committee report or conference report or floor debate." Undoubtedly, this search
missed a few cases, but it is unlikely that the search missed enough cases to distort
its value seriously. Cases returned by the search were reviewed to determine wheth-
er they really made reference to the legislative process, or simply mentioned some
committee report, the sequence of enactments on a particular subject matter, or oth-
er such items. No distinction was made among majority, dissenting, and concurring
opinions. Cases in which the Court sought legislative history but could not find any
also were included because they reflected a methodology that included such informa-
tion in the interpretive process.
192. See, e.g., Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928)
(Holmes, J.) ("It is said that when the meaning of language is plain we are not to
resort to evidence in order to raise doubts. That is rather an axiom of experience
than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it
exists."). For a discussion of broader changes in statutory interpretation associated
with the New Deal, see Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic
Legitimacy and Legal-System Values, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233, 262-64 (1997).
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law.19 Ultimately, the recognition that the language of a stat-
ute cannot resolve all disputes over its applicability to unfore-
seen cases became inescapable. As Eskridge points out, once the
Court had interpreted complicated regulatory statutes long
enough, it had to deal not only with language that it previously
found difficult, but also with the indeterminacies of its own
precedents. 94 Regardless of what one now thinks about the
wisdom of looking to such contextual information, most everyone
confronted with the task of deciding cases admitted its
necessity.195
This shift was not inevitable in an analytical sense, but it
should have been expected from the constant reminders of the
need to use context to resolve difficult interpretive problems. If
our concepts include prototypical images along the lines de-
scribed in Section I of this Article, it should not be surprising to
193. See Stephen A. Siegel, Let Us Now Praise Infamous Men, 73 TEX. L. REV. 661,
701-03 (1995) (book review). Siegel argues that the Fuller Court, during the last de-
cade of the nineteenth century and first decade of the twentieth century, was a
transitional Court in many respects. See id. at 695. Most crucial here was its will-
ingness to embrace a dynamic constitutionalism, conceding openly that as society
engages in new activities, the Court must reinterpret the Constitution to deal with a
changing world. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 387 (1898) ("[T]he law [may] be
forced to adapt itself to new conditions of society, and, particularly, to the new rela-
tions between employers and employ~s, as they arise."). None of the Fuller Court's
statutory decisions that looked to legislative history discussed the Court's decision to
do so. Thus, any discussion of the mindset of particular justices with respect to the
decision to turn to this information can be only speculative. It does seem reasonable
to hypothesize, however, that the transition from stasis to dynamism in constitution-
al analysis may correspond rather closely to the transition from textualism to con-
text-sensitive analysis in the realm of statutory construction. That is, members of
the Fuller Court generally were more open than were their predecessors to solving
problems in light of extratextual historical events. For a similar point that correlates
the increased use of legislative history in statutory cases with the growth of a sub-
jective view of substantive legal issues, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative His-
tory Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365, 370-71 (1990). For an interesting discussion
of the ambivalence that pervaded the literature on statutory interpretation during
this period, see William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in
Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799 (1985).
194. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 108, at 213.
195. For a contemporaneous discussion of the need for the Court to resort to
extratextual material, and the less than systematic way in which the Court actually
turned to such information, see Harry Willmer Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and
Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 2 (1939).
See infra notes 230-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Scalia's
counter-attack against the use of contextual information.
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learn that things happen in the world for which legal theories
give no definitive answer. Unless we look outside the language
of the statute itself, we will not discover a basis for making a
decision. Adding to the pressure to interpret statutes in this
manner was the increasing influence of the legal realist move-
ment, with its unyielding attack on a concept of law in which
the results of disputes were deducible from application of a com-
prehensible body of law to an ascertainable set of facts.196
2. Justice Frankfurter and the Narrow Rule of Lenity
This was the state of affairs when Felix Frankfurter was ap-
pointed to the Supreme Court in 1939. In the 1938-39 term, the
Supreme Court had made reference to the legislative history of a
statute (or to the absence of any history for it to rely on as an
interpretive aid) on twenty-five occasions.19 ' This environment
was radically different from the one in which Marshall and Sto-
ry had established longstanding interpretive doctrine, and
Frankfurter was very much part of this new culture. He wrote
in a 1947 article:
In the end, language and external aids, each accorded the
authority deserved in the circumstances, must be weighed in
the balance of judicial judgment. Only if its premises are
196. Professor Horwitz characterizes this aspect of legal realism in terms of a rejec-
tion of categories with hard and fast boundaries. See MORTON J. HORWITz, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 199-206 (1992).
197. This tally differs from a widely-cited study that claims 19 citations to legisla-
tive history in 1938 and 35 in 1939. See Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The
U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22
JURIMETRiCs J. 294, 303 (1982). The difference appears to be in the methodology. As
noted above, the survey used in this Article counted references to "legislative histo-
ry" generally, even when the Court stated that it could not find any such relevant
history, because such references reflect an actual effort to seek out legislative history
as part of the analysis of the statute. Carro and Brann, moreover, appear to have
counted citations to legislative history rather than cases containing citations to legis-
lative history. Although the text of their article is not entirely clear on this matter,
the number of citations in many years exceeds the number of cases that the Court
decided. In fact, their study shows the number of annual citations increasing to
about 100 in 1941, passing 200 for the first time in 1957, and doubling again to
more than 400 by 1973. See id. at 303. The last year of their study is 1979, in
which there were 405 citations. See id. For an empirical study of the use of legisla-
tive history in recent cases, see Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of
the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 355 (1994).
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emptied of their human variables can the process of statutory
construction have the precision of a syllogism. We cannot
avoid what Mr. Justice Cardozo deemed inherent in the prob-
lem of construction, making "a choice between uncertainties.
We must be content to choose the lesser." But to the careful
and disinterested eye, the scales will hardly escape appearing
to tip slightly on the side of a more probable meaning. 9 '
In that same article, Frankfurter showed himself to be well
aware of the early history of statutory interpretation, attributing
the growth in reference to legislative history to the widening of
the area of regulation, which "compelled consideration of [ all
that convincingly illumines an enactment, instead of merely that
which is called, with delusive simplicity, 'the end result.'"'99
All of this had a profound influence on how Frankfurter
viewed the interpretation of criminal statutes. In the five opin-
ions in which Frankfurter confronted the issue, he argued for
lenity in four,"0 twice in dissent.2"' In one of these, Frank-
furter used the word "lenity" to refer to the narrow construction
of criminal statutes for the first time in the Court's history.20 2
Frankfurter may not have invented the rule, but he apparently
did name it.
201
198. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 544 (1947) (footnote omitted).
199. Id. at 542 (referring specifically to John Marshall's approach).
200. See United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 417 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955); United States v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952); Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 346 (1945)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
201. See Turley, 352 U.S. at 417 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Singer, 323 U.S. at
346 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
202. See Bell, 349 U.S. at 83. Frankfurter wrote:
When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress
an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.
And this not out of any sentimental consideration, or for want of sympa-
thy with the purpose of Congress in proscribing evil or antisocial conduct.
It may fairly be said to be a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts
in the enforcement of a penal code against the imposition of a harsher
punishment.
Id.
203. Courts had used the word "lenity" from time to time as a synonym for lenien-
cy in various contexts, especially when referring to the conduct of juries, but it ap-
pears that no Supreme Court case prior to Bell used that word to state the rule
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In Callanan v. United States,"4 the last of his lenity opin-
ions, Frankfurter made the following statement, frequently quot-
ed by the Rehnquist Court in recent years:
But that "rule" [i.e., the rule of lenity], as is true of any guide
to statutory construction, only serves as an aid for resolving
an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one. "To rest upon
a formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means death." The
rule comes into operation at the end of the process of constru-
ing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an
overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers. That
is not the function of the judiciary. 5
Frankfurter cited recent opinions construing criminal statutes as
authority for this statement, distinguishing those in which the
Court had called for lenity. Only his own opinion in Bell,"'
however, even arguably relied on this approach to the interpre-
tation of criminal statutes.0 7
governing the interpretation of ambiguous criminal statutes. One lower court opinion
used it in 1851. See Ex parte Davis, 7 F. Cas. 45, 49 (N.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 3,613)
("'It was,' says Professor Christian, 'one of the laws of the twelve tables of Rome,
that whenever there was a question between liberty and slavery, the presumption
should be on the side of liberty. This excellent principle our law has adopted, in the
construction of penal statutes; for whenever any ambiguity arises in a statute, intro-
ducing a new penalty or punishment, the decision shall be on the side of lenity and
mercy .... ").
204. 364 U.S. 587 (1961).
205. Id. at 596 (footnote and citation omitted). As for the Rehnquist Court's reli-
ance on this passage, see infra note 230 and accompanying text.
206. In Bell, after calling for application of the rule of lenity, Frankfurter noted:
This in no wise implies that language used in criminal statutes should
not be read with the saving grace of common sense with which other
enactments, not cast in technical language, are to be read. Nor does it
assume that offenders against the law carefully read the penal code be-
fore they embark on crime. It merely means that if Congress does not fix
the punishment for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt
will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offens-
es, when we have no more to go on than the present case furnishes.
Bell, 349 U.S. at 83-84. For a discussion of Frankfurter's philosophy concerning the
interpretation of criminal statutes in the context of his opinion in Bell, see HENRY J.
FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 208-09 (1967).
207. Other than Bell, which is rather cryptic in its description of how courts should
apply the rule, Frankfurter cited four lenity cases in Callanan, none of which uti-
lized the approach he advocated. See Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 419
(1959) (stating that the Court resolves an ambiguity in favor of lenity when required
104 [Vol. 40:57
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Contrary to Frankfurter's assertion in Callanan, Marshall had
used lenity in Wiltberger °s "as an overriding consideration of
being lenient to wrongdoers." 0 9  Marshall's position in
Wiltberger that "probability is not a guide which a court, in con-
struing a penal statute, can safely take,"21 was reprehensible
to Frankfurter, who had no interest in using lenity to thwart
clear legislative intent.2 ' Frankfurter had in earlier opinions
expressed his disapproval of this traditional approach to the
interpretation of criminal statutes, but until Callanan he at
least acknowledged its existence. In Singer v. United States,1 2
decided seventeen years before Callanan, Frankfurter remarked
in his dissent:
In the past, to soften the undue rigors of the criminal law,
courts frequently employed canons of artificial construction to
restrict the transparent scope of criminal statutes. I am no
friend of such artificially restrictive interpretations. Criminal
statutes should be given the meaning that their language
most obviously invites unless authoritative legislative history
or absurd consequences preclude such natural meaning.21
to determine intent of Congress in punishing multiple aspects of same criminal act);
Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958) (stating that the policy of lenity
means that the Court will not interpret a criminal statute so as to increase the pen-
alty that it places on an individual 'when such an interpretation can be based on no
more than a guess as to what Congress intended"); Prince v. United States, 352
U.S. 322, 329 (1957) (stating that its holding is consistent with "our policy of not at-
tributing to Congress, in the enactment of criminal statutes, an intention to punish
more severely than the language of its laws clearly imports in the light of pertinent
legislative history"); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218,
221-22 (1952). Frankfurter declared:
[Wihen choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct
Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the
harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in lan-
guage that is clear and definite. We should not derive criminal outlawry
from some ambiguous implication.
Id.
208. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820), discussed supra notes 146-58 and accompanying
text.
209. Callanan, 364 U.S. at 596.
210. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 105.
211. See United States v. Hood, 343 U.S. 148, 150-51 (1952) (stating that a statute
prohibiting the sale of influence in obtaining political office applies even when office
does not exist but is merely authorized).
212. 323 U.S. 338 (1945).
213. Id. at 346 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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The statement has a distinctively disrespectful tone, especially
when we recall that it was Marshall who first adopted this prin-
ciple in the United States."4 In the context of the opinion,
however, Frankfurter was making the rhetorical point that even
the narrowest rule of lenity demanded reversal because the
statute Was read most naturally to exclude culpability in that
case. Singer involved a conspiracy prosecution under the Selec-
tive Training and Service Act of 1940 for conspiring to avoid the
draft. 215 The defendant had committed no overt act in further-
ance of the scheme.216 The federal conspiracy statute then in
effect required an overt act,217 but the Selective Training Act
did not." 8
The statute at issue in Singer proscribed a list of wrongs,
among them the knowing dereliction of duty by those in the se-
lective service system.1 9 The last item on the list was the most
serious: "or any person or persons who shall knowingly hinder or
interfere in any way by force or violence with the administration
of this Act or the rules or regulations made pursuant thereto, or
conspire to do so."22° The question was whether "or conspire to
do so" refers to only the last item on the list-involving vio-
lence-or to all of the statute's proscriptions. The majority opin-
ion, written by Justice Douglas, argued that conspiracy to vio-
late any of the provisions on the list was a crime, 21 while
Frankfurter took the position that the Act only criminalized con-
spiracy to commit violence.2 As a linguistic matter, Frank-
furter was right: the Act was ambiguous, and the most natural
reading was the narrower one.223
214. In his extrajudicial writings, Frankfurter wrote respectfully of Marshall, but
warned: "Marshall's intrinsic achievements are too solid and his personal qualities
too homespun to tolerate mythical treatment. It is important not to make untouch-
able dogmas of the fallible reasoning of even our greatest judge, and not to attribute
godlike qualities to the builders of our nation." Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall
and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 219 (1955).
215. See Singer, 323 U.S. at 338.
216. See id.
217. See 18 U.S.C. § 88 (1944).
218. See Singer, 323 U.S. at 339.
219. See id.
220. 50 U.S.C. app. § 311 (1944) (emphasis added).
221. See Singer, 323 U.S. at 341-42.
222. See id. at 346 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
223. This is a classic case of the last antecedent rule, a canon of construction that
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Frankfurter's departure from the traditional statement of leni-
ty correlated with the changed role that legislative history
played in statutory analysis. For both Marshall and Story, as for
the English judges before them, inquiry into the meaning of a
statute was limited to the statute's words as further resolved by
certain grammatically oriented canons of construction. It was
not an accident that Livingston Hall wrote his influential 1935
article that advocated for the elimination of lenity" in favor of
reading statutes to reflect their fair meaning after the interpre-
tive shift had caught hold, but before Frankfurter narrowed the
rule of lenity in accordance with this shift.
Perhaps it would be more accurate to describe Frankfurter's
innovation as applying the traditional rule of lenity in the new
interpretive culture, and not as a reformulation of the rule itself.
In the traditional mode of interpretation, courts looked first to
the language of the statute, then to canons of construction. If
these were not dispositive, lenity would apply. The new interpre-
tive culture added legislative history and other extratextual ma-
terials to the types of information that courts were willing to
examine. In both instances, lenity comes at the end of the pro-
cess. The difference between Frankfurter's view and Marshall's,
however, should not be trivialized. Frankfurter wanted to make
sure courts did not act to frustrate legislatures that attempted
in good faith to criminalize certain ranges of conduct. To Frank-
furter, lenity was not as much about language as it was about
residual uncertainty after careful study. In this sense, his vision
of lenity differed sharply from the traditional one. This Article
therefore refers to Frankfurter's version of lenity as a new, more
narrow one.
Somewhat ironically, Frankfurter criticized what he saw as
the aggressive use of legislative history by the courts to obscure
the meaning of statutory language that he found plain on its
surface.2" Nonetheless, Frankfurter did not himself hesitate to
use extratextual material in statutory cases. In Callanan, he
calls for linking modifying phrases to the last antecedent, unless context requires
otherwise. The problem is that when the modifying phrase comes at the end of a
list, the notion "last antecedent" itself is ambiguous between the list itself and its
last entry. For a discussion of this tension, see SOLAN, supra note 24, at 29-38.
224. See Hall, supra note 4, at 762-63.
225. See Franlfurter, supra note 198, at 543-44.
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looked at the legislative history of the Hobbs Act in deciding
that substantive violations of the Act and conspiracies under the
Act could be punished as separate offenses notwithstanding the
rule of lenity.226 In Singer, he cited a speech by the Chairman
of the Committee on Military Affairs to support his position that
lenity should apply.227 The Court used legislative history in al-
most all of the other lenity cases in which Frankfurter wrote an
opinion.228
The relationship between the scope of lenity and approaches
to statutory interpretation generally has implications for current
statutory doctrine. A full hundred years separated Frankfurter
from Marshall when Frankfurter initiated his attack on the tra-
ditional application of lenity. With the appointment of Justice
Scalia to the bench in 1986, however, a new voice of textualism
is present. The predictable result has been a resurrection of the
debate that Frankfurter seemed to have won against Marshall.
III. LENITY IN THE REHNQUIST COURT
This section of the Article discusses some current trends in
the interpretation of criminal statutes that follow from both the
interpretive framework described in Section I and the history set
forth in Section II.229 First, this section discusses Justice
Scalia's attempt to return to a broader version of lenity as part
226. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 591 (1961) (citing extensively the
details of the record of the House Judiciary Committee).
227. See Singer, 323 U.S. at 348.
228. See United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 414 (1957) (Burton, J.) (invoking
the legislative history of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act); United States v.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.) (invoking
the legislative history of the Fair Labor Standards Act to argue for applying lenity).
229. This section of the Article does not purport to be an encyclopedic review of all
issues presently confronting the courts with respect to the interpretation of criminal
statutes. For example, the Supreme Court has been creating a confused jurispru-
dence concerning the interpretation of criminal statutes with civil counterparts. Com-
pare United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517-18 (1992) (ap-
plying lenity to obtain a narrow interpretation of civil tax statute with criminal
counterpart) with United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2203-04 (1997) (inter-
preting criminal securities fraud statute broadly in light of earlier broad interpreta-
tions of civil counterpart). Both of these cases are discussed below in a somewhat
different context. I leave for future work the issue of how to reconcile the different
considerations that go into interpreting statutes with both civil and criminal enforce-
ment mechanisms.
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of his textualist program, and argues that he has not succeeded,
as the Rehnquist Court routinely applies the narrow, Frankfurt-
er version of lenity. Second, this section criticizes the Rehnquist
Court's narrowing lenity even further by rejecting it in virtually
every case in which the issue is the breadth of meaning of dis-
puted words.
A. Lenity and the Debate Over Textualism
In recent years, the Supreme Court has adopted Frankfurter's
narrow formulation of the rule of lenity with progressive fre-
quency. ° Chief Justice Rehnquist has taken the lead in this
regard,"' with the effect of limiting the occasions on which the
Court finds a statute ambiguous. Frankfurter's Callanan opin-
ion, quoted above, frequently is cited by various justices as the
Court's pronouncement of the rule."2
Justice Scalia, in contrast, has had far less influence than the
Chief Justice on the Court's position on lenity, if influence is
measured by the publication of majority decisions. Nonetheless,
he has provoked vigorous and exciting debate on the principle
both among his colleagues on the Supreme Court233 and'in the
academic literature."4 In essence, Scalia has attempted to be-
come to Frankfurter what Frankfurter had been to Marshall.
A detailed critique of Scalia's textualism is beyond the scope
of this Article. 5 The focus here is on the relationship between
230. See, e.g., Bates v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 285, 291 (1997); United States v.
Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921, 931 (1997).
231. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 602-06 (1995); Reno v. Koray, 515
U.S. 50, 64-65 (1995); United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 69 (1994)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); NOW v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 261 (1994); Chapman
v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463-64 (1991); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S.
333, 342 (1981).
232. See, e.g., Granderson, 511 U.S. at 77 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting); NOW, 510
U.S. at 262; United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 311 (1992) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring); Chapman, 500 U.S. at 463; Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 410
(1991). It is interesting to note that citations to Callanan, which were only occasion-
al during the Warren and Burger Courts, have increased substantially in the
Rehnquist Court, in keeping with the current Court's active engagement in debate
over interpretive issues.
233. See, e.g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 107-08 (1990); R.L.C., 503
U.S. at 305-06; Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 (1991).
234. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 4; Note, supra note 123, at 197.
235. See Solan, supra note 27, at 235-36 and references cited therein for a discus-
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the use of context in statutory interpretation and the nature of
lenity. One would expect, if the positions taken in this Article
are right, that Scalia's textualist orientation would lead him
back in the direction of Marshall's version of lenity. For if one
continues to respect the values that underlie lenity, then an in-
terpretive method that tolerates reduced investigation into the
purpose and context of a statute will require a broader and
somewhat more mechanical application of that principle.
That is exactly what has happened.' In a series of opin-
ions, mostly concurrences and dissents, Scalia has staked out a
position very reminiscent of John Marshall's, especially those as-
pects of it that Frankfurter apparently had put to rest. The most
notable of these is his concurring opinion in United States v.
R.L.C.2" 7 In R.L.C., the Court was faced with the interpreta-
tion of the federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, a provision of
which limits the term for which detention may be ordered for
certain juveniles to "the maximum term of imprisonment that
would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted
as an adult."238 A teenager subject to the Act had killed a two-
year old while driving drunk."9 He was convicted of man-
slaughter following a bench trial." ° The issue was whether the
Court could impose the maximum statutory penalty for man-
slaughter (three years), or whether it was limited to the maxi-
mum sentence that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines would
permit under the circumstances (twenty-one months).24'
The statute is silent on the issue of whether the term of im-
prisonment is limited solely by the term authorized in the un-
derlying statute, or the term authorized under the statute read
in light of the Sentencing Guidelines.242 This creates an ambi-
guity.24 The statute uses "authorized" as a passive verb with-
sion of textualism.
236. This point is hinted at in Note, supra note 123, at 205.
237. 503 U.S. 291 (1992). For an extensive discussion of R.L.C., see Kahan, supra
note 4, at 391-96; Note, supra note 123, at 216-19.
238. 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(1)(B) (1994).
239. See R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 294.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 295.
242. See id.
243. For a discussion of the rather narrow sense in which I use the term "ambigu-
ity," see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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out an overt agent. The statute does not say "by whom" or "by
what" the sentence must be authorized, just as "the ball was
thrown through the window" does not say who threw the ball. In
this context, there are two potential implied agents: the statute
and the Sentencing Guidelines. If the implied agent is inferred
to be the statute, then a three-year sentence will be imposed. If
it is inferred to be the guidelines, then a twenty-one month
sentence will be imposed. The issue was not the fit between
concepts and events. Rather, it was which of two plausible but
distinct meanings the Court should adopt.
Writing for a plurality with respect to some issues, and a ma-
jority with respect to others, Justice Souter analyzed the statute
by using the narrow, Frankfurter version of the rule of lenity.
He concluded that lenity was not necessary in this case, because
the Court has "always reserved lenity for those situations in
which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended
scope even after resort to 'the language and structure, legislative
history, and motivating policies' of the statute."'4 Based on the
Court's investigation into these matters, Souter concluded that
the Congress did not intend the statute to be interpreted broad-
ly, as the Government would have it.245 Thus, Souter did not
even reach the issue of lenity, which would have led to the same
result in any event.
In a concurring opinion, Scalia took strong issue with Souter's
approach. His principal concern was that if a court in applying
lenity first takes into account legislative history and "motivating
policies" behind a statute, a defendant is in jeopardy of being
held accountable not only for those acts that violate the plain
language of statutes, but also for those acts that violate a court's
speculations about what a group of hundreds of people had in
244. R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 305-06 (quoting Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103,
108 (1990)). Souter's characterization of lenity as "always" reserved for situations in
which a doubt exists after the history and motivating policies of a statute are inves-
tigated is no more accurate than Frankfurter's statements to that effect more than
thirty years earlier. Souter, like Frankfurter before him, obscured the fact that this
methodology is quite recent.
245. See id. at 297.
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mind when they voted for the statute."6 This, Scalia argued,
cannot possibly further the underlying values that motivate
lenity.247 As for notice, Scalia wrote:
It may well be true that in most cases the proposition that
the words of the United States Code or the Statutes at Large
give adequate notice to the citizen is something of a fiction,
albeit one required in any system of law; but necessary fic-
tion descends to needless farce when the public is charged
even with knowledge of Committee Reports."5
Furthermore, Scalia expressed grave concern about cases in
which examination of these extratextual materials leads a court
not to the more lenient reading of the statute, as happened in
R.L.C., but to the harsher one, as happened in Dixson v. United
States. 9 This, he argued, would subvert separation of powers,
the other rationale for lenity." Were it to become the norm,
we would not rely on the legislature to enact statutes, but rather
on the courts to divine from all kinds of extrinsic materials what
it was that motivated the legislators to vote for the statute's
enactment.
Scalia won only Justice Thomas's vote. The problem is that, as
most justices recognize, we really do not understand, without
turning to context, what people have in mind when they
speak."1 If that context is sometimes unreliable, it means only
that our linguistic capacity is less robust than we would wish it
to be in an ideal world. Without the context, however, we would
have virtually no comprehension at all, especially when it comes
to complicated statements such as the ones contained in the
246. Id. at 308-09 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Moskal, 498 U.S. at 108).
247. See id. at 308 (Scalia, J., concurring).
248. Id. at 309 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S.
25, 27 (1931)).
249. See id. at 310 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S.
482 (1984)).
250. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
251. See Solan, supra note 27, at 251-62 for a discussion of how context contributes
to our understanding of language. For a discussion of how crucial a role context
plays in determining which alternative meaning of a word is intended, see George A.
Miller, Contextuality, in MENTAL MODELS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE: ESSAYS IN HONOR
OF PHIL JOHNSON-LAIRD 1 (Jane Oakhill & Alan Garnham eds., 1996).
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United States Code. Souter stated as much in his response to
Scalia:
It is true that the need for fair warning will make it "rare
that legislative history or statutory policies will support a
construction of a statute broader than that clearly warranted
by the text," and that "general declarations of policy," wheth-
er in the text or the legislative history, will not support con-
struction of an ambiguous criminal statute against the defen-
dant. But lenity does not always require the "narrowest" con-
struction, and our cases have recognized that a broader con-
struction may be permissible on the basis of nontextual fac-
tors that make clear the legislative intent where it is within
the fair meaning of the statutory language. 2
Souter was right. In a system that denies judges the opportu-
nity to look at extratextual material, a broader rule of lenity is
needed. When judges can consult such things as purpose and
legislative history freely, though, courts also should take this in-
formation into account in deciding whether to apply the rule of
lenity. If looking to context means less lenity, cherished values
are not compromised so long as the accepted interpretation is
both within the "fair meaning of the statutory language" and
within the intent of the legislature as gleaned by independent
investigation. Only when issues of actual notice arise, i.e., when
a defendant claims in good faith to have misunderstood a crimi-
nal statute, will we have to question this approach.
Two years after deciding R.L.C., the Supreme Court confront-
ed a similar problem, this time in connection with a statute
dealing with the prison term that a person must serve if he pos-
sesses illegal drugs during probation. In United States v.
Granderson,"3 the defendant, a letter carrier, had been fined
and placed on five years probation after pleading guilty to one
count of destruction of mail.' Had he been sentenced to pris-
on, the Sentencing Guidelines would have called for a term of
zero to six monthsY5 While on probation, Granderson tested
252. R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 305 n.6 (citations omitted).
253. 511 U.S. 39 (1994).
254. See id. at 43.
255. See id.
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positive for cocaine, an infraction for which "the court shall re-
voke the sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to
not less than one-third of the original sentence." 6 The issue in
Granderson was what "one-third of the original sentence" meant
in this situation.257 The phrase could have meant one third of
the five-year probation, which would have the effect of actually
shortening the defendant's sentence; it could have meant one-
third of the six-month maximum sentence to which he could
have been sentenced originally, which would have required him
to serve two months in prison; or, as the government successful-
ly argued to the district court, it could have meant that
Granderson had to serve twenty months in prison, which is one-
third of the sixty month term that had earlier been probation
time.
-2 58
Affirming the court of appeals, which had reversed the district
court, the Supreme Court took the middle position: the statute
required a two-month prison sentence. 9 Justice Ginsburg,
who wrote the majority opinion, concluded, in essence, that
Congress simply drafted the statute poorly. Looking at the legis-
lative history, she conjectured that Congress probably had in
mind an older sentencing regime in which those receiving proba-
tion first received a prison sentence, which was suspended in
favor of the probationary period. 6 ° In this light, both the stat-
utory scheme and the result of the case make sense. Finding
that "text, structure, and history fail to establish that the
Government's position is unambiguously correct,"2 61 Ginsburg
applied the rule of lenity. 62
Scalia and Kennedy each concurred in the judgment. Scalia
would have read the statute literally to require twenty months
256. 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) (1988) (provision repealed 1994).
257. See Granderson, 511 U.S. at 45.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 55.
260. See id. at 42, 52.
261. Id. at 54.
262. See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented. He had no trouble with the Court's
use of legislative history, but found it unpersuasive in this particular case. See id.
at 74 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Rehnquist would have reinstated the district
court's harsher sentence. See id. at 78 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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probation, plus one-third the fine.2" Kennedy by and large
agreed with Scalia, except for the fine.2 Neither would have
rescued Congress from the consequences of its "wretchedly
drafted statute."2" The only reason for concurrences instead of
dissents was that Granderson already had served eleven months
in prison waiting for the completion of his appeal.266 Moreover,
Kennedy argued, if the Court were serious about lenity, it would
have chosen the most lenient of the three options." 7 Thus,
both would have supported a broader rule of lenity on textualist
grounds.
Lenity is thus a real, but not an overriding aspect of the inter-
pretation of criminal statutes for most of the current Supreme
Court. It informs the interpretive process and breaks ties. It
does not take the place of serious investigation into statutory
language, the overall purpose of the statute, and the statute's
legislative history.
B. Vagueness and Ambiguity in the Rehnquist Court
Recall Chief Justice Marshall's discomfort in Wiltberger with
the relationship between the rule of lenity and the problem of
vagueness.266 Marshall knew that lenity could convert statuto-
ry interpretation into a language game every time the scope of a
word is placed in issue. He was unwilling to infer meaning
broader than the words that Congress used, even at the cost of
accepting an undesirably narrow interpretation of a statute.
When Congress has spoken in words that arguably, but not nec-
essarily, encompass the conduct before a court, however, the
263. See id. at 59 (Scalia, J., concurring).
264. See id. at 60-69 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
265. Id. at 60 (Scalia, J., concurring).
266. See id. at 58 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 60 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
267. See id. at 60-69 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
268. As Marshall stated:
[Tihough penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be con-
strued so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature.
The maxim is not to be so applied as to narrow the words of the statute
to the exclusion of cases which those words, in their ordinary acceptation,
or in that sense in which the legislature has obviously used them, would
comprehend.
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820); see supra notes 153-58.
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court must decide how broadly to interpret the statute. Simply
choosing the narrowest interpretation will not do.
Marshall's words were dicta, but as soon as a court begins to
confront the problem of vagueness seriously, it becomes clear
that statutes give us less rule of law than initially meets the
eye. As discussed in Section I, prototype effects cause virtually
all concepts to become fuzzy at the margins. Legislators, being
human, have no choice but to write statutes that incorporate
concepts into rules, forcing courts to decide what to do when cas-
es arise that are remote from the prototype, but nevertheless
within the periphery of the concept.
Ambiguity, in contrast, is far less of a threat to the rule of
law. For one thing, problems of ambiguity arise less frequently.
While concepts generally become vague at the margins, unre-
solvable ambiguity occurs only from time to time. Moreover, if a
statute can mean either a or b, and investigation into the legis-
lative process does not disclose which of a or b was intended,
courts can apply the rule of lenity and allow the legislature to
override the ruling if it is important. The situation is correct-
able. Problems of vagueness are by and large not correctable.
New situations that challenge a statutory interpreter to make
decisions about the appropriate breadth of a statute arise con-
stantly.
Judges do not write about lenity in quite this way. Remarks
about the nature of word meaning, however, such as Marshall's
comments in Wiltberger, demonstrate an intuitive understanding
of the problem. Contemporary cases repeat this sentiment, fre-
quently reminding us that in applying the rule of lenity, courts
are not obliged to give statutory words their narrowest meaning
when a broader interpretation would better serve the indepen-
dently discovered goals of the legislature.269
It is difficult to find recent cases in which the Supreme Court
has applied the rule of lenity when the linguistic issue is vague-
269. See, e.g., United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 306 n.6 (1992) ("But lenity
does not always require the 'narrowest' construction, and our cases have recognized
that a broader construction may be permissible on the basis of nontextual factors
that make clear the legislative intent where it is within the fair meaning of the
statutory language.").
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ness. For example, in United States v. O'Hagan,27 the Su-
preme Court interpreted section 10 of the Securities Exchange
Act as creating insider trading liability against an attorney
whose firm represented the bidder in a tender offer, but who
traded securities in the target." The attorney never had "in-
side information" in the usual sense, since he never had any
relationship with the company whose stock he was trading.2
The Court held, though, that the use of such information con-
stituted a fraud under the Act."'
Section 10(b) outlaws the use of a "deceptive device" "in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security." The ma-
jority opinion in O'Hagan held "deceptive device" to extend to
the use of information misappropriated from any source (in this
case the defendant's law firm's client) to whom the defendant
owed a fiduciary duty. 5 The statute requires deception in con-
nection with a securities transaction; it does not say against
whom the deception must be practiced.7 6
This is a classic case of statutory vagueness. The issue here,
as it was in Church of the Holy Trinity and McBoyle, was the fit
between statutory words and unusual events. In O'Hagan, the
Court held the fit was good enough. 7 ' OHagan illustrates the
Court's reluctance to apply lenity to resolve conceptual vague-
ness. Thus, the Court has interpreted the expression "use a fire-
arm" broadly to include trading a firearm for cocaine; 78 the
270. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
271. See id. at 2204-05.
272. See id. at 2205.
273. See id.
274. Id. at 2206-08.
275. See id.
276. See id. at 2206-07. Justice Scalia, dissenting, would have applied the rule of
lenity. See id. at 2220 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, also dissented. See id. at 2221-26 (Thom-
as, J., dissenting). Thomas would have interpreted section 10(b) more narrowly with-
out resort t6 lenity. Thomas argued that the misappropriation of information was
complete prior to its use to profit in securities trading, and that therefore the "in
connection with" component of section 10(b) was not met. See id. at 2221.
277. In Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Court held that the fit
was not good enough when the person trading on inside information was an employ-
ee of a financial printer who owed no duty to any of the parties. See id. at 231-35.
278. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 234-35 (1993).
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expression "official detention" against the interest of a defendant
to exclude a locked drug rehabilitation center;. 9 the concept
"enterprise" broadly to include anti-abortion groups for purposes
of interpreting RICO;28 ° the federal conspiracy statute not to
require proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy;"
and "extortion under color of official right" broadly so as not to
require demand for the funds extorted. 82
Only in a few cases has the Court in the past several years
ruled in favor of a defendant when the linguistic issue was
vagueness. In United States v. Aguilar,283 the Court, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, interpreted the obstruction
of justice statute narrowly to hold that a judge making false
statements to FBI agents in the course of a criminal investiga-
tion was not "endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, or impede...
the due administration of justice" required for conviction under
the statute." The Court held that the false statements must
have a nexus with judicial proceedings, such as a grand jury.2"
Virtually all of the statute's other provisions made reference to
such proceedings. The majority held that absent proof that the
judge knew that his false statements would influence grand jury
investigations and the like, he had not obstructed justice. 86 In-
terestingly, Rehnquist never mentioned the rule of lenity, but he
did mention its rationales of "deference to the prerogatives of
Congress," and "fair warning... to the world in language that
the common world will understand."287 It was Justice Scalia, in
dissent, who argued correctly that the majority really was apply-
ing lenity through the back door. To Scalia, the statute was so
clear that his broader rule of lenity did not apply. 88
279. See Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995).
280. See NOW v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 258-62 (1994).
281. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 15 (1994).
282. See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268-69 (1992).
283. 515 U.S. 593 (1995).
284. Id. at 598.
285. See id. at 599-600.
286. See id. at 601.
287. Id. at 600 (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)).
288. See id. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Similarly, in United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co.," 9
the Court narrowly construed a provision of the National Fire-
arms Act that imposed a $200 tax per unit on anyone "making"
"a firearm.""' The statutory definition of "firearm" included
short-barreled rifles, but did not include regular, long-barreled
rifles, or handguns. 1 Thompson/Center Arms was selling kits
for converting handguns into rifles, but if the purchaser of the
kit used only some of its parts, she could convert the handgun
into a short-barreled rifle.2 The Supreme Court said Thomp-
son/Center Arms should not be taxed on the kits. Focusing its
attention on whether Thompson/Center Arms did enough to
have "made" a statutorily-defined firearm, the Court observed
that "although it is a tax statute that we construe now in a civil
setting, the NFA has criminal applications that carry no addi-
tional requirement of willfulness."29 The Court continued:
"Making a firearm without approval may be subject to criminal
sanction, as is possession of an unregistered firearm and failure
to pay the tax on one. It is proper, therefore, to apply the rule of
lenity and resolve the ambiguity in Thompson/Center Arms' fa-
vor."294 Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that a civil tax stat-
ute should not be subject to the rule of lenity, and that the ma-
jority was unduly limiting congressional authority to regulate
firearms." 5
289. 504 U.S. 505 (1992).
290. See 26 U.S.C. § 5821 (1994).
291. See id. § 5845(a)(3).
292. See Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. at 508.
293. Id. at 517.
294. Id. at 518 (citation omitted). The majority opinion, written by Justice Souter,
focused on the fact that the kit allowed the completion of either short- or long-bar-
reled rifles. See id. at 509-19. Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, agreed that
the rule of lenity applied, but believed that the ambiguity arose only from the fact
that the "firearm" had not been completely assembled, and therefore was arguably
not "made" as required by the statute. See id. at 519-23 (Scalia, J., concurring). As
between these two positions, Scalia had the better one.
295. See id. at 525 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Recently, Justice Stevens did succeed
in obtaining a majority of Justices to construe a firearm regulation statute broadly.
In Bryan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1939 (1998), the Court refused to apply the
rule of lenity to the Firearm Owners' Protection Act, which makes it illegal to deal
in firearms without a license. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) (1998). Section
924(a)(1)(D) imposes criminal penalties against those who "willfully violated . . . this
chapter." Id. § 922(a)(1)(D). Bryan argued unsuccessfully that "willfully" should be
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In contrast to its being generally unsympathetic to arguments
of statutory vagueness, the Court has been more generous in
applying lenity to cases in which the statute is ambiguous. Thus,
in Granderson,"6 the Court interpreted the ambiguous term
"original sentence" narrowly in connection with a statute govern-
ing the revocation of probation.297 The mens rea requirement
for "willful violation" of a statute, making it illegal to circumvent
the cash transaction reporting requirements, was construed
narrowly to require knowledge of the illegality of the activi-
ty."8 Similarly, the mens rea requirement for "knowingly" vio-
lating the food stamp statutes was construed as requiring
knowledge of the law.299
Professor Jeffries has suggested that the rule of lenity be re-
placed by a principle that courts should interpret statutes to
maximize the rule of law."'0 As both Marshall and Story recog-
nized almost two hundred years ago, however, rule of law prob-
lems will recur whether or not we maintain the rule of lenity.
The very way we conceptualize makes it inevitable that we al-
ways will have to cope with borderline cases. Marshall's solution
was for courts to give words their "ordinary meaning," which, in
psychological terms, instructs courts not to stray too far from the
prototype in holding criminal defendants liable for violations of
law. The Supreme Court has a long history of looking at con-
construed to mean that the defendant. knew that he needed a federal license. See
Bryan, 118 S. Ct. at 1946. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, disagreed,
requiring only that the defendant knew his conduct was illegal. See id. at 1947. Jus-
tice Scalia, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that the
rule of lenity should apply. See id. at 1949-52 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia, citing
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994), took the position that statutes
with the same syntax as this one have been construed to require more than a gen-
eral knowledge of illegality. See Bryan, 118 S. Ct. at 1951 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Scalia endorsed an intermediate position in which the government would not have to
prove that the defendant knew of a federal license requirement, but would have to
prove that the defendant knew generally that one needs to be licensed to deal in
firearms. See id. at 1951-52 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
296. United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39 (1994); see supra notes 253-67 and
accompanying text.
297. See Granderson, 511 U.S. at 45.
298. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 148-49 (1994).
299. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985), discussed supra text ac-
companying notes 17-27.
300. See Jeffries, supra note 4, at 219-23.
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cepts in this light, and still does so, although not consistent-
ly.3"' In this regard, Justice Scalia's advocacy of the "ordinary
language" canon has been very constructive in furthering a psy-
chologically realistic approach to the thorny problem of the scope
of vague statutory concepts."0 2
For the same reasons, one should not infer from these inter-
pretive difficulties that the rule of lenity is useless or dead."'
If our courts today purported to apply the naked lenity of com-
mon law times,0 4 such an argument would have considerably
more force. Undoubtedly, courts do not choose the narrowest
interpretation of statutory concepts. In the contemporary world
of interpretation, however, courts apply lenity only after serious
investigation into legislative intent, prior court decisions, the
structure of the statute as a whole, its legislative history, and
other contextual information. It is entirely possible to use lenity
as a guide, but to conclude that Congress did not intend the nar-
rowest interpretation of each statutory word. Marshall under-
stood this point, which has even more relevance in today's inter-
pretive culture than it did when he wrote.
Some level of discretion is a necessary part of statutory inter-
pretation. Typically, conservative courts will exercise their dis-
cretion to construe concepts in criminal statutes broadly, while
more liberal courts will be more generous to defendants. As hu-
man beings, we make rules that include vague concepts and am-
biguous syntax. We need judges to decide what to do when this
301. See supra text accompanying notes 91-112 (discussing Church of the Holy Trin-
ity u. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25
(1931), and Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993)). The Court recently applied
this method in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), the Supreme Court's se-
quel to Smith. In Bailey, the Court placed limits on the breadth of what it means to
use a firearm in a drug trafficking crime. See id. at 150-51.
302. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); see also SCALIA, supra note 111, at 23-25 (discussing his dissent in Smith by
stating that "when you ask someone, Do you use a cane?' you are not inquiring
whether he has hung his grandfather's antique cane as a decoration in the hall-
way").
303. The uneven application of the rule of lenity in cases involving the scope of
legally significant concepts is a point made by its critics. See Jeffries, supra note 4,
at 198-201; Kahan, supra note 4, at 346.
304. See supra notes 123-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the strong
rule of lenity applied in seventeenth century England.
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happens. There is nothing that we can do to change that fact,
which is a consequence of our own biology.
IV. MUST CRIMINAL STATUTES BE INTERPRETED NARROWLY?
Because the narrow approach to lenity limits its role in the
interpretation of statutes, we might ask whether it should be
eliminated altogether. This section argues that lenity plays an
important role in the way we interpret criminal statutes and it
therefore should not be eliminated.
Fortunately for those who wish to study the matter, there is a
sizable body of data as to what happens when a jurisdiction
eliminates lenity in favor of a principle of fair statutory con-
struction. Largely in the late nineteenth century and prior to the
interpretive shift discussed earlier in this Article,0 5 the legis-
latures of many states replaced the rule of strict construction
with the principle that courts should follow the legislative
will."' We now have had approximately a century of experi-
ence with these rules. A look at their application over time in
two large states-New York and California-shows that even
states that have rejected lenity use it anyway when the court
has no other basis for deciding what to do. This follows from the
combination of the deeply embedded values that lenity embodies
and the frailties in our cognitive competence discussed earlier in
this Article. Sometimes, we should admit, we really cannot tell
with any confidence what to do. When this happens, courts re-
sort to lenity even in jurisdictions that eliminated the doctrine
legislatively more than one hundred years ago.
Moreover, it should not go unnoticed that the Supreme Court,
despite its conservative bent-first under Chief Justice Burger
and more recently under Chief Justice Rehnquist-continues to
adhere to lenity. No justice, even in such a conservative court,
has advocated its elimination. We should ask why. In particular,
we should ask what it is that is so deeply rooted in the judicial
305. See supra notes 179-96 and accompanying text.
306. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1.211 (West 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4
(West 1988); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.080 (Michie 1997); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 5.00
(McKinney 1998).
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culture that for two hundred years even the most conservative
judges have found a place for lenity in criminal cases.
This section first addresses the experience of states that have
eliminated lenity by statute. It then discusses a recent proposal
by Professor Kahan that the Department of Justice issue author-
itative rulings on the interpretation of statutes in advance of
prosecution, reserving lenity only as a "stick" to punish the De-
partment when it has not done its interpretive job in time.0' It
concludes with a review of the status of lenity's underlying ratio-
nales: due process and separation of powers.
A. Failed Efforts to Eliminate Lenity
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, a number of states
eliminated lenity by statute."8 In New York, for example, the
Penal Code contains the following provision, which has been
part of New York law since 1881:
The general rule that a penal statute is to be strictly con-
strued does not apply to this chapter, but the provisions here-
in must be construed according to the fair import of their
terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law.3"
If the arguments presented thus far are correct, this change to
the code is not likely to make much difference. That is, if (1) the
values of fair notice and legislative primacy are deeply embed-
ded in our system; (2) language is by its nature vague and am-
biguous at times; (3) context is sometimes, but only sometimes,
able to remediate vagueness and ambiguity; and (4) lenity is
applied only in cases in which the legislative purpose with re-
spect to a series of events is not clear after investigation; we
should expect that (5) lenity is a virtual necessity.
A review of the experience in New York suggests that this is
so. In case after case, the courts continue to construe criminal
statutes narrowly when context does not make it clear that the
legislature intended disputed conduct to fit within the scope of
307. See Kahan, supra note 12, at 488-89, 507-11.
308. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (West 1989); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 5.00
(McKinney 1998).
309. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 5.00 (McKinney 1998). The statute was first enacted as
section 11 of the Penal Code of 1881, and was first proposed in 1864 as part of the
Field Code. For a discussion, see Hall, supra note 4, at 753 n.25.
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the statute. This was the case when Professor Hall observed it
disapprovingly some sixty years ago,310 and it is still true to-
day. For example, in People v. Phyfe,31' an 1893 case decided
shortly after the legislature enacted the interpretive rule, the
New York Court of Appeals made it clear that defendants were
still entitled to fair notice.312 "The citizen is entitled to an un-
equivocal warning before conduct on his part, which is not ma-
lum in se, can be made the occasion of a deprivation of his liber-
ty or property."313 Seventy-seven years later, the courts were
still saying the same thing. In People v. Sansanese,14 the New
York Court of Appeals held that a false driver's license should
not be deemed an "instrument" for purpose of a statute prohibit-
ing the filing or recording of forged instruments. 35 The Court
reasoned: "While on the one hand we must not be overly techni-
cal in interpreting penal provisions, on the other hand 'Penal re-
sponsibility ... cannot be extended beyond the fair scope of the
statutory mandate.' 31
6
Moreover, New York courts read the statute to require them
to look outside the words of the statute, to "the policy consider-
ations underlying the statute and the ultimate results sought by
the Legislature."317 Using this approach, the courts have found,
notwithstanding section 5.00 of the Penal Law, that "it is impos-
sible to obtain a conviction under an ambiguous statute unless
the defendant is clearly guilty under all reasonable interpreta-
tions of that statute."
318
When Courts apply the statute, they often use it to reject un-
naturally narrow readings of statutes whose applicability is rela-
310. See Hall, supra note 4, at 755 n.39.
311. 32 N.E. 978 (N.Y. 1893).
312. See id. at 979.
313. Id.
314. 217 N.E.2d 660 (N.Y. 1966).
315. See id. at 662.
316. Id. (citing People v. Wood, 167 N.E.2d 736, 738 (N.Y. 1960)).
317. People v. Santiago, 506 N.Y.S.2d 136, 138 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
318. People v. Familo, 516 N.Y.S.2d 416, 419 (Oswego City Ct. 1987); see also Peo-
ple v. Scott, 258 N.E.2d 206, 210 (N.Y. 1970) (ignoring Penal Law § 5.00 in favor of
the principle that "[a] penal enactment must not only be strictly construed, especial-
ly where, as here, the act is a malum prohibitum and not a malum in se, but it
must be reasonable and pellucid as well" (citation omitted)).
124 [Vol. 40:57
LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LENITY
tively transparent in the case under dispute. Thus, despite a
long history with a Penal Code that rejects lenity, New York
courts continue to impose lenity when they have nothing better
to say about how a statute should be interpreted. This may not
occur often, but it does occur periodically, as it has for decades.
California, which abolished strict construction of its criminal
code in 1871,319 has seen a similar response from the courts.
While Professor Hall listed California as among the enlightened
states whose courts abided by its liberal construction stat-
ute,320 the actual record is mixed. Thus, in 1890, the Supreme
Court of California noted in the course of ruling against the
state on a criminal appeal:
While it is true the rule of the common law that penal stat-
utes are to be strictly construed has been abrogated by the
Code... it is also true that the defendant is entitled to the
benefit of every reasonable doubt, whether it arises out of a
question of fact, or as to the true interpretation of words, or
the construction of language used in a statute .... 21
Decades later, in 1932, a California appellate court held that a
court-appointed receiver's embezzlement of an estate was not a
violation of a statute prohibiting the embezzlement of public
monies, notwithstanding the receiver's status as an officer of the
court.322 The court explained:
Where the language employed is ambiguous or doubtful in its
intent, a construction of the statute should always be favor-
able, rather than unfavorable, to any person accused of a vio-
319. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (West 1988). The statute reads:
§ 4. Construction
CONSTRUCTION OF THE PENAL CODE. The rule of the common law,
that penal statutes are to be strictly construed, has no application to this
Code. All its provisions are to be construed according to the fair import
of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.
Id. For a discussion of the contemporaneous enactment of the Civil Code, and the
jurisprudential ramifications of the codification of interpretation, see Blatt, supra
note 193, at 819.
320. See Hall, supra note 4, at 756 n.41.
321. In re Rosenheim, 23 P. 372, 373 (Cal. 1890).
322. See People v. Showalter, 14 P.2d 1034 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932).
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lation of the law. In other words, although the common-law
rule that penal statutes be strictly construed has no applica-
tion to the provisions contained in the Penal Code, neverthe-
less a criminal statute should be construed according to the
fair import of its terms.3
This language is double-talk. The court was trying, unsuccessful-
ly, to reconcile its common law handling of this case with the
dictates of a statute that demanded the contrary.
Probably the most famous case in which the California courts
have refused to construe a criminal statute liberally is Keeler v.
Superior Court," in which the Supreme Court of California
decided a fetus is not a "human being" for purposes of constru-
ing California's homicide statute.25 Keeler, who had discovered
that his estranged wife was pregnant, kicked her in the abdo-
men during a confrontation, cracking the fetus's skull."' Jus-
tice Mosk, who wrote the majority opinion, resorted to lenity. He
noted that throughout California history, "human being" has
meant a human being born alive for purposes of the statute:
It is the policy of this state to construe a penal statute as
favorably to the defendant as its language and the circum-
stances of its application may reasonably permit; just as in
the case of a question of fact, the defendant is entitled to the
benefit of every reasonable doubt as to the true interpretation
of words or the construction of language used in a stat-
ute.327
After quoting Marshall's warning in Wiltberger that courts
should not expand criminal statutes to criminalize all instances
of the evil with which the legislature had concerned itself, Mosk
concluded:
Whether to thus extend liability for murder in California is a
determination solely within the province of the Legislature.
323. Id. at 1035.
324. 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
325. See id. at 623.
326. See id.
327. Id. at 624.
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For a court to simply declare, by judicial fiat, that the time
has now come to prosecute under section 187 one who kills
an unborn but viable fetus would indeed be to rewrite the
statute under the guise of construing it.3"
Thus, Mosk not only presented the rule of lenity as a basis for
the court's decision, but he resorted to its underlying separation
of powers rationale, Marshall and all. Professor Jeffries agrees
with the holding in Keeler, but would reach the result by a dif-
ferent route. He argues that the holding in Keeler is attractive
not because it promotes strict construction, but because it fur-
thers the rule of law as a value. 29 The tWvo may not be separa-
ble, however. Notice and legislative primacy are important val-
ues to us precisely because they promote the rule of law. For
this reason, Professor Jeffries's suggestion that lenity can be re-
placed by canons that call for decisions consistent with rule of
law values may not fully solve these interpretive issues. The
bottom line is that courts sometimes do not know what to do
when asked to interpret a statute. Lenity best promotes deeply
held values when that situation arises.
This is not to say that California courts never give criminal
cases the liberal construction that the Penal Code requires. In
recent years, California's Supreme Court has been a conserva-
tive one. It has not been afraid to interpret criminal statutes
liberally, and has even challenged the boundaries of the linguis-
tic wall."' A broader survey of the California judiciary, howev-
er, shows that in other cases courts analyze the facts in terms of
the narrow rule of lenity. In some of these cases, the court re-
jects the narrowest possible interpretation after engaging in the
328. Id. at 625-26.
329. See Jeffries, supra note 4, at 226-33.
330. See, e.g., People v. Cruz, 919 P.2d 731 (Cal. 1996). The court interpreted "in-
habited dwelling house" to include boats for purposes of a sentence enhancement
statute in order to further legislative intent. Id at 733. The burglary statute in ef-
fect at that time listed boats, but the statute in question did not. See id. at 734-35.
The case resembles Wiltberger in many respects, but with the opposite result.
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analysis.331 In other cases, courts apply lenity to resolve the
case in favor of the defendant.332
In neither New York nor California have the courts been will-
ing to give up lenity, especially when it is applied narrowly. The
courts continue to feel that a tie-breaker is needed despite legis-
lative action seemingly to the contrary. As discussed below, our
concept of the rule of law combines with limits in our linguistic
competence to make the rationales that underlie lenity robust to
the point of being virtually indestructible.
B. Should the Chevron Doctrine Trump Lenity?
The rule of lenity traditionally has been given priority over
the principle that courts are to defer to administrative agencies
in construing statutes.333 If it were otherwise, it would be up to
the jailer-not the judge-to determine how long the prisoner
was to remain incarcerated, a proposition that the courts have
been unwilling to accept. For example, in United States v.
McGoff,34 Judge Starr wrote for the court of appeals that
criminal defendants are "far outside Chevron territory," and re-
fused to defer to the interpretation by the Justice Department of
the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938."' 5
331. See People v. Phelps, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 858 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (acknowl-
edging narrow version of lenity as California policy, but holding it inapplicable be-
cause restitution statute in issue was clear); People v. Ramon A., 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d
59, 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (analyzing case under narrow rule of lenity, then holding
that statute was clear enough; rejecting argument of youth who stole a car and al-
lowed a passenger carrying a gun to ride with him that he was not guilty of permit-
ting firearm into car because he did not know whether gun was loaded).
332. See, e.g., People v. Rosalio S., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534, 537-38 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (holding that statute that made reference to the length of a knife's blade
should be construed to require measurement of only the sharpened portion of the
instrument); People v. Bartlett, 276 Cal. Rptr. 460, 465 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
that defendant convicted of "selling or transporting cocaine" should not have proba-
tion revoked, where revocation statute applies to those convicted of "selling" con-
trolled substance). This is a prototypical case of lenity applied to an ambiguous stat-
ute.
333. See, e.g., United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 440 (1960).
334. 831 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
335. Id. at 1077; see also Note, Increased Judicial Scrutiny for the Administrative
Crime, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 612, 645-46 (1992) (arguing that deference to Chevron is
not appropriate when recognition of congressional trust in agency expertise is inap-
plicable).
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In a provocative article, Professor Kahan suggests that the
rule of law would be well-served if the Department of Justice
were to promulgate authoritative interpretations of the criminal
code to which courts had to defer.3 ' Although this proposal in-
evitably would lead to the sacrifice of very important values,
much of what Kahan says is compelling. Most importantly, it
raises the issue of institutional choice.337
Kahan's principal argument is that many criminal statutes
are so broad and vague that they necessarily require that their
interpreter give them meaning.3 8 When Congress legislates, it
implicitly delegates lawmaking authority. Kahan suggests that
important values would be better served if the Department of
Justice were the delegatee of this power, rather than the
courts.339 First, he argues that the Justice Department has
more experience than the courts with issues of crime and pun-
ishment. 4 Second, the Justice Department is more unified
than the courts, and therefore more able to create a coherent
jurisprudence of criminal law.34' Finally, under the current
system, aggressive U.S. Attorneys, who often have their own
agendas, pull the courts in all directions. 42 Interpretations
promulgated by the Department of Justice are likely to be more
tempered and judicious.343
How is all of this to work? Courts will have to defer to Justice
Department interpretations of statutes that are promulgated in
advance of prosecution.3" Lenity would be reserved as "a stick"
to punish the Department of Justice with a narrow interpreta-
tion of a statute if it has not been quick enough at the draw to
promulgate a broad one before a prosecution.345 Presumably, as
336. See Kahan, supra note 12, at 469.
337. For an interesting essay arguing that we routinely should evaluate our choice
of institutions in allocating responsibility, see Neil K. Komesar, Exploring the Dark-
ness: Law, Economics, and Institutional Choice, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 465.
338. See Kahan, supra note 12, at 469-70.
339. See id. at 469.
340. See id. at 495.
341. See id. at 495-96.
342. See id. at 496-98.
343. See id.
344. See id. 496-500.
345. See id. at 507-11.
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such lapses are corrected, courts will construe criminal statutes
with more and more breadth.346
Kahan bases his proposal on some questionable factual as-
sumptions. For example, contrary to Kahan's assertions, there is
little reason to believe that the Justice Department is that much
more expert at interpreting criminal statutes than are the
courts. As Kahan points out, federal courts handle some 45,000
criminal cases annually.347 That should be enough experience
for anyone. One of the principal arguments of Chevron, that
agencies entrusted with carrying out policy are in the best posi-
tion to interpret statutes that govern their activities ,348 is far
less compelling here. Second, Kahan may be correct in asserting
that rules emanating from the Department of Justice are likely
to be more tempered than some of the hyperaggressive positions
taken by U.S. Attorneys bent on increasing their own visibility
in their communities. 49 U.S. Attorneys, however, do not have
the final say in the outcomes of their cases. The courts do, and
the United States Attorneys do not always win.35°
Finally, Kahan is correct in pointing out that a single inter-
pretation promulgated by the Department of Justice would cre-
ate a more coherent jurisprudence than one in which the circuits
are at war with each other. This is his most compelling argu-
ment, but it does come at some cost-the elimination of stare
decisis in criminal law. Consider the turmoil that would have
346. See id.
347. See id. at 486 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
1994 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 433 tbl. 5.6 (1995)). Since Kahan
completed research for his article, the number has increased. During the period
ending June 30, 1997, just under 50,000 cases were commenced in the district
courts. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, STATISTICAL TA-
BLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 42 tbl. D (1997).
348. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844-45 (1984).
349. See Kahan, supra note 12, at 496-97.
350. To support his claim about U.S. Attorneys, Kahan relies heavily on the abuses
of Rudolph Giuliani as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. See id.
at 487. Giuliani, however, is not principally criticized for prompting the Second Cir-
cuit to interpret the federal criminal code broadly. Rather, Giuliani is criticized for
prosecuting individuals without adequate proof after ruining their reputations in dra-
matic press conferences. See DANIEL FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO DE-
STROY MICHAEL MILKEN AND HIS FINANCIAL REVOLUTION 60-68 (1995).
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ensued if President Reagan's Attorney General, Edwin Meese,
had been in charge of interpreting criminal statutes in the
1980s, to be followed by Janet Reno in the 1990s on behalf of
the Clinton administration. Thus, Kahan's system trades in-
creased coherence at any particular time for greater incoherence
over time. It likewise places great value on uniformity, and no
value on benefits that may accrue from being able to evaluate
retrospectively the different positions taken by different federal
courts in order to forge coherent policy over time.
While these criticisms suggest that we should proceed cau-
tiously with Kahan's proposal, none of them argues strongly
against it. There are, however, more fundamental problems with
the suggestion that the criminal law be Chevronized. First, the
Constitution's dictate that Article III judges be appointed for
life35' increases the likelihood they will be willing to make un-
popular decisions. In contrast, the Department of Justice 6fficial
who interprets a statute too narrowly to enhance the political
prospects of the administration's party can be fired. Recent stud-
ies show that people blame the courts for being too soft on
crime.352 A president might not be as willing to see members of
the administration similarly blamed. Most complex societies val-
ue an independent judiciary. When it comes to matters of crime
and punishment, a society should think hard before it decides to
relinquish its judicial function to the prosecutors.
Second, Kahan's proposal has a strange irony, which comes
from assuming lenity to be a mechanical rule, like naked lenity,
instead of a default rule that comes into play only after careful
study does not yield a result to the contrary. Consider once
351. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
352. See Laura B. Myers, Bringing the Offender to Heel, in AMERICANS ViEW CRIME
AND JUSTICE 46, 46 (Timothy J. Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire eds., 1996). A sub-
stantial majority (67%), for example, believes that it is a problem that courts do not
reduce crime. See also JONATHAN P. CAUTLKINS ET AL., MANDATORY MINIMUM DRUG
SENTENCES: THROWING AWAY THE KEY OR THE TAXPAYERS' MONEY? xxv (1997) (citing
a RAND Drug Policy Research Center study suggesting that legislative reaction to
polls favoring elongated sentences is not an efficient way to deal with drug crimes);
ELLIOTr CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 4-11 (1998) (stating public
opinion, which maintains the justice system is too soft on criminals, is misguided,
and that "harsher" treatment is not the solution).
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again United States v. Granderson,353 the case in which the Su-
preme Court held that a defendant who violated probation by
testing positive for drugs should be sentenced to one-third the
maximum prison sentence he could have received had he not
been placed on probation (i.e., one-third of six months)-not one-
third of the term he was to serve on probation (i.e, one third of
sixty months).354 The government argued that the latter inter-
pretation of the relevant statute was appropriate.355
Let us assume that this case were to arise in the Chevron re-
gime that Kahan envisions, and that the Justice Department
had not promulgated any reading of the statute at the time of
the case. The result presumably would be the same as the result
in the real Granderson case: the Court would apply lenity and
accept the defendant's interpretation of the statute. Significant-
ly, the lenity that the Court applied in Granderson was the nar-
row rule of lenity. The Court applied the rule only after it was
convinced that it could not ascertain congressional intent to the
contrary.
Now let us assume that the Justice Department had promul-
gated its interpretation prior to Granderson's prosecution. The
result would change. The courts would be obliged to defer to the
prosecutor, regardless of what the legislature actually intended.
The Granderson court applied lenity only after doing its best
to ascertain congressional intent. Even Scalia's concurrence
shared that goal, although Scalia disagreed with the majority
about the nature of the evidence that the Court should feel free
to consider.
Contrast this with a case in which lenity was rejected.
O'Hagan356 is a good example. In that case, the Supreme Court
accepted the government's broad interpretation of insider trad-
ing, based on close analysis of both the statutory language and
the history of interpretation of the securities laws.357 Assume
once again that the Chevron regime is in place, and that the
353. 511 U.S. 39 (1994), discussed supra notes 253-67 and accompanying text.
354. See id. at 55.
355. See id. at 45.
356. O'Hagan v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997), discussed supra notes 270-
76 and accompanying text.
357. See id. at 2205-14.
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Department of Justice has failed to speak on the issue. Presum-
ably, lenity then should apply as a "stick" to punish the Depart-
ment of Justice for not having promulgated a rule to cover that
case in advance.
These results trivialize the decisionmaking process. As Section
I showed, the beauty of broad categories is that they allow us to
generalize a single decision to a multitude of situations. Their
cost is that it is not always easy to determine whether a particu-
lar event falls within them. The solution to this endemic concep-
tual problem should not be reward and punishment of the bu-
reaucracy for the speed with which it acts. A court's engagement
in thoughtful analysis should not occur only when the Depart-
ment of Justice fails to promulgate a broad rule that does not
take congressional intent into account, and may, in fact, inten-
tionally thwart it. Were the only currently available approaches
to the interpretation of statutes the aggressive positions of the
most vigilant U.S. Attorney on the one hand, or naked lenity on
the other, Kahan's proposal would have some force. No argu-
ment exists, though, for abandoning thoughtful decisionmaking
in favor of a regime in which the prosecutor wins whenever the
executive branch beats the courts to the punch.
Finally, the same conceptual difficulties that plague statutes
today will, as a matter of biological necessity, plague Justice De-
partment interpretations of them. That is why we need lenity in
the first place. Interpretive problems result not only from the
occasional congressional drafting error, but far more frequently
from the way that the human mind works. There always will be
a next case, and someone will have to decide whether that next
case falls within a Justice Department interpretation, or is a
candidate for lenity.
While the current system is laden with problems, the combi-
nation of narrow, context-oriented lenity, the "ordinary meaning"
canon, and the linguistic wall roughly approximate prototype
analysis of statutory concepts. Together, they act as a brake on
the impulse to interpret every statutory word to its outer bound-
ary. However imperfectly this system works (and it works very
imperfectly), it helps to maintain at least some nexus between
the legislative process on the one hand and the outcomes of
19981 133
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
criminal cases on the other. Requiring deference to the most ag-
gressive interpretation that the words of a statute can tolerate
decontextualizes interpretation. We should reject Kahan's pro-
posal for the same reason that our courts rejected naked lenity
two hundred years ago."'
C. Lenity's Values
1. Notice
Lenity's rationales are still very much in our consciousness,
and account for our steadfast adherence to the principle despite
the protests of state legislatures and legal scholars. Notice to
defendants is, of course, largely fictional. Notwithstanding
Marshall's concern, we can be quite sure that Wiltberger did not
read the statute books to determine the absence of federal juris-
diction before committing manslaughter on a merchant marine
ship docked in a river in China. The courts, however, continue to
take seriously the notion that criminal statutes must give fair
notice, even if nobody reads them. Holmes explained the reason
for this in McBoyle:
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consid-
er the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is rea-
sonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in
language that the common world will understand, of what
the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.359
358. This is not to say that the Chevron doctrine should play no role in the inter-
pretation of criminal statutes. Criminal statutes often make reference to knowing
violations of regulations. When a defendant challenges the validity of those regula-
tions, courts will measure their legality under the Chevron doctrine. In fact, this is
just what happened in O'Hagan. One issue in that case was the legitimacy of the
SEC's adoption of Rule 14e-3(a) pursuant to section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act. In rejecting the defendant's argument, the Court held:
Therefore, in determining whether Rule 14e-3(a)'s "disclose or abstain
from trading" requirement is reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent
acts, we must accord the Commission's assessment "controlling weight
unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."
In this case, we conclude, the Commission's assessment is none of these.
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2217-18 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
359. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
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As Justice Harlan elaborated some decades later:
The policy thus expressed is based primarily on a notion of
fair play: in a civilized state the least that can be expected of
government is that it express its rules in language all can
reasonably be expected to understand. Moreover, this require-
ment of clear expression is essential in a practical sense to
confine the discretion of prosecuting authorities, particularly
important under a statute... which imposes criminal penal-
ties with a minimal, if any, scienter requirement.3"
Harlan's restatement puts the notice rationale in perspective.
The issue is not whether defendants read the statute books; for
the most part, they do not."5' The system of criminal justice,
however, is not concerned only with notice to the defendant, but
also with notice to all those empowered to punish people on be-
half of the government, especially prosecutors and judges. The
notion of limited government based on the rule of law crucially
depends on there actually being law. The principle that criminal
statutes should be comprehensible to those against whom the
government inflicts violent punishment reaffirms the rule of law
each time punishment is meted out.
In part because of the indeterminacies of language and in part
because we are simply not able to predict all situations that we
might wish to come within the scope of a rule, legislatures al-
ways will be only partly successful in drafting rules of general
application. The notice rationale behind the rule of lenity tells
us to accept in ourselves this frailty, and to let the defendant go
360. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 236 (1966) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting). In Standard Oil, the majority held that the spillage of oil constituted the
discharge of "refuse matter" under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. See id. at
229-30. Justice Harlan dissented. Nonetheless, he agreed that notice was not a seri-
ous issue in that case: "[Ilt is difficult to justify a narrow reading of § 13 on this
basis [i.e., lack of notice]. The spilling of oil of any type into rivers is not something
one would be likely to do whether or not it is legally proscribed by a federal
statute." Id. at 235 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
361. Criminal violations of regulatory statutes are a separate matter. For example,
we do hold corporate polluters responsible for knowing the Clean Water Act, and
therefore will allow prosecution for knowing violations of that act based solely on a
defendant's knowledge that it is emitting certain pollutants into the environment.
See Filippi, supra note 8, at 924-28.
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free when we are uncertain about the law's applicability for the
sake of being more confident that we are doing the right thing
when we do exercise the force of law. It is for this reason that
our courts continue to adhere to the notice rationale, even know-
ing that the citizenry rarely receives whatever notice is actually
given. What the notice says, and who says it, are more impor-
tant than who is listening. Thus, while Kahan may be correct in
asserting that the notice rationale can frequently (but perhaps
not always) be collapsed into the separation of powers rationale
in lenity cases, 62 it is not clear that it should be.
By the same token, these observations weaken Justice Scalia's
argument that resort to legislative history in criminal cases is
inconsistent with the notice rationale. 6 Scalia is willing to en-
gage in the following fictions: defendants have read the criminal
code; defendants have read all controlling court decisions inter-
preting the code; defendants have read all other provisions of
the code that use the same words as the provision in dispute;
defendants have read relevant regulations and dictionaries; and
defendants have studied the canons of construction. It is hard to
see, even on Scalia's own terms, why reading the Congressional
Record would be any more of a burden on his idealized defen-
dant.3" This Article's perspective, in contrast, is that we need
not engage in these fictions at all. What we really should care
about is that enough process has occurred, consistent with the
linguistic wall 6' and the context in which the statute was en-
acted, to justify a claim that a defendant is being held to a pub-
licly articulated standard of conduct.
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its commitment to the
notice rationale. In United States v. Lanier,6 ' Justice Souter,
writing for a unanimous Court, reinstated a conviction under
362. See Kahan, supra note 4, at 349-56.
363. See United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 307-11 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also supra notes 244-52 and accompanying text.
364. Professor Jeffries makes a similar point. See Jeffries, supra note 4, at 205-12.
365. By "the linguistic wall," I mean the principle that criminal statutes should not
be construed beyond the meanings of their words, even if it would make sense to do
so because similar conduct to that proscribed is just as bad. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 119-21.
366. 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997).
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section 242 of the criminal code, which makes it a crime for a
person acting under color of law to "depriv[e]" another "of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States."67 While serving as
a state judge in Tennessee, Lanier had sexually assaulted five
women in his chambers, including a woman whose daughter's
custody remained subject to his jurisdiction. 68 The Sixth Cir-
cuit had reversed the conviction, holding that for section 242 to
apply, fair warning required that the deprivation of rights that
are the subject of the crime must have been recognized by the
Supreme Court itself in a case with facts "fundamentally simi-
lar" to the one being prosecuted.369
Finding this standard too stringent, the Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that "criminal liability under § 242... may be
imposed for deprivation of a constitutional right if, but only if,
'in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [under the
Constitution is] apparent.'3" 7 To meet this standard, the gov-
ernment may rely on decisions of the circuit courts as well as
those of the Supreme Court.
7 1
While the Court reasonably settled for a somewhat reduced
set of criteria for there to be fair warning, it emphatically reaf-
firmed its commitment to the notion itself, associating the rule
of lenity with the constitutionally mandated void for vagueness
doctrine and the due process clause. The Court cited both
Wiltberger and McBoyle, and noted the relationship between fair
notice and legislative primacy.372 The underlying reasoning of
367. The statute reads in relevant part:
§ 242. Deprivation of rights under color of law
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or cus-
tom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, or District to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected
by the Constitution or laws of the United States .... shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both ....
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994).
368. See Lanier, 117 S. Ct. at 1222-23.
369. United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996).
370. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. at 1228 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)).
371. See id. at 1224-28.
372. See id. at 1224-25.
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this case seems sound, and comports with the vision of notice
discussed above.
The more compelling cases for attacking the legitimacy of the
notice rationale are those in which the defendant obviously
knows his conduct to be illegal, but the statute is ambiguous.
Statutes that confer federal jurisdiction over otherwise criminal
activity, such as the mail fraud statute,37 the statute proscrib-
ing interstate transportation of "falsely made securities,"74 and
RICO, 75 are among the obvious examples. Courts are likely to
interpret these statutes broadly.376
For example, in Moskal v. United States, 377 the question was
whether a defendant's commerce in genuinely issued automobile
titles containing false information constituted transportation
across state lines of "falsely made securities."3 " At the time
the operative statute was enacted in 1939,"' 9 "falsely made"
was a synonym for counterfeit. Indeed, the statute proscribes not
only trafficking in falsely made securities, but also in counterfeit
and forged ones, and in the tools for making them.380 Anyone
reading the statute for the first time today, however, unless that
reader has special knowledge, would think that one meaning of
"falsely made" is something like "made with false information."
Thus, Moskal was on notice that the statute proscribed his con-
duct, but the notice was of something that the legislature in all
likelihood never intended to be part of the crime.
This was good enough for the majority. Looking at the legisla-
tive history, the Court found this construction consistent with
the statute's broad purpose in an opinion by Justice Thurgood
Marshall: "Congress enacted the relevant clause of § 2314 in
order to 'com[e] to the aid of the states in detecting and punish-
373. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
374. Id. § 2314 (1994).
375. See id. § 1961-1968 (1994).
376. See Kahan, supra note 4, at 372-81; see also Schmuck v. United States, 489
U.S. 705 (1989) (interpreting mail fraud statute); Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S.
103 (1990) (interpreting statute proscribing transportation of falsely made securities);
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) (interpreting RICO).
377. 498 U.S. 103 (1990).
378. See id. at 105.
379. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994).
380. See Moskal, 498 U.S. at 107 n.1.
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ing criminals whose offenses are complete under state law, but
who utilize the channels of interstate commerce to make a suc-
cessful getaway and thus make the state's detecting and puni-
tive processes impotent.' 38'
Moskal is completely at odds with McBoyle. In both cases, the
language of the statute at the time of interpretation was most
easily read to support a conviction under the statute, providing
more than adequate notice. In both cases, the purposes underly-
ing the statute would best be served by so applying the statute.
And in both cases, the enacting legislature had no inkling that
the statute would be so applied. The difference between the two
cases was that Holmes applied the broader rule of lenity of the
earlier era in McBoyle, while Justice Thurgood Marshall applied
the narrower, Frankfurter version in Moskal. As for Holmes's
prototype analysis, a defender of Moskal simply could argue that
Holmes analyzed the statute appropriately, but chose the wrong
interpretive community. He should have been looking at the
statute as of the time of the alleged violation.382
In contrast, Scalia's dissent in Moskal sounds much more like
the John Marshall who wrote Wiltberger than the Thurgood
Marshall who wrote the majority opinion in Moskal. Resorting to
a host of dictionaries, early court decisions, and related statuto-
ry provisions, Scalia demonstrated convincingly that the enact-
ing Congress almost certainly had in mind a statute that
criminalized the transportation of forged documents. Scalia,
therefore, would have applied the rule of lenity, but the rule of
lenity that he would have applied was not the one that most
members of the Court have adopted. As in his concurrence in
R.L.C., Scalia would have used the broader, textualist version of
lenity.
Scalia probably had the better of the argument even on the
majority's terms. Nonetheless, the majority decision in Moskal is
381. Id. at 110 (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379
(1946).
382. In other words, Holmes did not interpret the statute dynamically. See general-
ly ESKRIDGE, supra note 108 (discussing dynamic interpretation); Lessig, supra note
108 (same). For an insightful discussion of how the notion of interpretive community
plays a role quite generally in statutory interpretation, see William S. Blatt, Inter-
pretive Communities in Statutory Interpretation (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on
file at the University of Miami).
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defensible. The decision is consistent with the broad purposes of
the statute, and does not violate the linguistic wall.383 Thus,
cases such as Moskal should not lead us to doubt the vitality of
lenity in statutory interpretation. That conclusion would come
only from misunderstanding lenity to be a rule far more rigid
than it has been for many decades. Professor Jeffries's excellent
article, despite its valuable insights, makes this error. He ar-
gues: "The notion that every statutory ambiguity should be re-
solved against the government, no matter what the merits of the
case, seems to me simplistic and wrong."3' Jeffries may be
right, but he has not properly characterized the rule that the
courts actually apply.
The Supreme Court's broad interpretations of RICO present
another apparent challenge to the vitality of lenity. RICO is an
unusual statute for two reasons. First, it has its own built-in
directive that it should be interpreted liberally.3" Second, RI-
CO criminalizes, under certain circumstances, activities that are
otherwise crimes in any event, including some violent
crimes.388 Thus, neither the notice nor legislative primacy ra-
tionales should lead to strict construction of RICO, except in
cases in which broad interpretation would take a court too far
from the underlying purposes of the Act. This may explain why
the Court has construed one RICO term after another broad-
ly, 87 while narrowly interpreting efforts by civil litigants to ex-
383. In contrast, see supra note 119 for a discussion of Schmuck v. United States,
489 U.S. 705 (1989). The Court's reading of the mail fraud statute is so aggressive
in Schmuck that it probably violated the linguistic wall by requiring defendants to
obey provisions that the statute's language does not include whatsoever, under any
reasonable reading. I agree with Justice Scalia's dissent:
The purpose of the mail fraud statute is "to prevent the post office from
being used to carry [fraudulent schemes] into effect." The law does not
establish a general federal remedy against fraudulent conduct, with use
of the mails as the jurisdictional hook, but reaches only "those limited
instances in which the use of the mails is a part of the execution of the
fraud, leaving all other cases to be dealt with by appropriate state law."
In other words, it is mail fraud, not mail and fraud, that incurs liability.
Id. at 722-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
384. Jeffries, supra note 4, at 219.
385. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994).
386. See id.
387. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237 (1989)
(construing "pattern of racketeering activity" broadly in a civil case); Sedima,
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pand the class of RICO defendants to people only tangentially
involved in businesses in which the racketeering activities have
occurred. 88 However badly RICO was drafted, it provides ade-
quate notice to anyone engaged in its predicate acts of fraud and
violence that there is potential criminal liability. An accountant
who omitted crucial information from a shortened version of a
financial report presented at a shareholders meeting has far less
notice.389
2. Legislative Primacy
The notion of legislative primacy is also deeply embedded in
our entire jurisprudence of statutory interpretation.9 ' No one
on the Court advocates, as a general rule, the application of stat-
utes in a manner at odds with the wishes of the enacting legisla-
ture. As we have seen, questions of legislative primacy most of-
ten arise when the issue in a case is the fit between a
nonprototypical instance of a proscribed category and the catego-
ry itself. The question becomes whether the legislature would
have wanted courts to apply the statute in such unusual circum-
stances, even if the circumstances do fall within the outer
boundaries of the statutory language.3 9'
What about cases in which the legislature no doubt intended
conduct to fall within a statute, but did not say so? Wiltberger'is
an example. If, in fact, research into legislative history and oth-
er matters revealed that Congress really intended to take juris-
diction over manslaughter cases on American vessels docked in
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985) (interpreting civil liability provisions
of section 1964 broadly to favor plaintiffs in order to effectuate remedial purpose of
the statute); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20-29 (1983) (construing "inter-
est" broadly for purposes of RICO's criminal forfeiture provision); United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) (interpreting "enterprise" broadly to include non-legiti-
mate businesses).
388. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183, 186 (1993) (holding that an
accounting firm that had committed securities fraud was not liable under RICO pro-
vision that penalized those who participated in the conduct of an enterprise because
it did not participate in the day-to-day affairs of the entity).
389. See id. at 174-75.
390. For a discussion and review of the literature, see Maltz, supra note 90.
391. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892);
supra notes 93-98, 179-81, and accompanying text.
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foreign rivers, the motivation to interpret the statute to include
Wiltberger's conduct would be greater. Jurisdictional cases, like
Wiltberger and Moskal, are weak candidates for application of
the rule of lenity, especially a strong version of that rule, be-
cause the federal statute merely grants a forum in which other-
wise culpable behavior can be tried. Defendants have more than
adequate notice that the conduct in question is criminal. The
only issue is whether Congress has decided that the federal
courts shall be the place in which the case may occur. If Con-
gress appears to have so decided based on the historical record,
and has said so in the statute-although not in words that are
unequivocable-it is difficult to argue that the sort of fair play
that troubled Justice Harlan should be an issue.392 This is not
to say that Wiltberger should be overruled. The linguistic wall
still stands; but it does mean that we are likely to be more toler-
ant of linguistic uncertainty when the defendant is independent-
ly on notice of the criminal nature of his activity and both the
language of the statute and the legislative history support a
broader reading.
Professor Kahan takes the position that fidelity to the ratio-
nale of legislative primacy requires that courts acknowledge at
the outset that the legislature intended the two branches to
work in harmony to promulgate a criminal law that is largely
legislative, but interstitially judicial.393 No doubt he is correct.
Moreover, inquiry into what the legislature would have intended
in a novel case routinely leads to different conclusions. Anyone
who reads the majority and dissenting opinions in Moskal or
R.L.C. cannot avoid this conclusion.
This means that contextually-laden inquiry into legislative
purpose, combined with a narrow rule of lenity, does not fully
determine the outcome of every case. We still need judges, and
392. The record in Moskal does not make the decision so easy. On the one hand,
the legislative history indicates that Congress was attempting to assert federal juris-
diction over crimes involving interstate commerce, which particular states may not
wish to prosecute. See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 110-11 (1990). On the
other hand, it is relatively clear, as Justice Scalia points out in dissent, that Con-
gress really thought that it was dealing with counterfeit securities, and not with the
sort of fraud that Moskal had committed. See id. at 123-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
393. See Kahan, supra note 12, at 470.
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those judges will not always reach consensus. Constrained only
in part, they will have to exercise their judgment and do the
best they can to create a coherent and rational jurisprudence.
A moment of frustration occurs when a judge, having to decide
whether to apply a linguistically unclear statute, must shrug her
shoulders and recognize that even after careful study she cannot
tell what the legislature would have done if it had addressed the
matter, and that the rule of law will not be compromised regard-
less of the holding in the particular case. That is "lenity time."
Given the ways in which our concepts fail to match crisply the
events thai occur in the world, the situation will arise periodi-
cally. It may not happen often, but it will occur. Even if one
attempts to replace lenity with other principles, such as Profes-
sor Jeffries's well-motivated set of rules to the effect that
statutes should be interpreted to enhance the rule of law,394
the need for lenity will return. We cannot get rid of it, even
when we try.
CONCLUSION
This Article began with a discussion of linguistic and concep-
tual issues that appear to drive problems of statutory interpreta-
tion. Chief Justice Marshall characterized these problems, which
continue to arise today, by and large in the ways that he de-
scribed. Our two hundred year history of grappling with the
same interpretive issues should be seen in light of aspects of our
biological endowment. Thus, there is no escaping them.
A combination of deeply held values and the frailties of the
human condition ultimately motivate lenity. This explains both
why state legislatures have not been able to get rid of it, and
why efforts by academics to advocate its demise fall on deaf judi-
cial ears. A great deal of this Article focused on showing how
these problems led both to a change in interpretive culture in
the beginning of this century, and to a change in the way that
criminal statutes are analyzed. Knowledge of this history, along
with sensitivity to the cognitive issues that necessitate our
thinking seriously about interpretation of statutes in the first
394. See Jeffies, supra note 4, at 212-19, 222-23.
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place, make it possible to evaluate the current state of interpre-
tive doctrine more fully and subtly.
These issues, taken together, do not present coherent doctrine,
but they do show how recurrent conceptual and linguistic issues
shape legal argument. The interpretation of criminal statutes
requires that we acknowledge both linguistic ambiguity and dif-
ficulties in conceptualization, and that we then apply complex
analysis of context to try to resolve these difficulties. It is, there-
fore, unrealistic to expect to find a set of procedures that will
lead to consistent interpretation. Who the judges are, and how
they look at events in the world, will always matter. We can try
to set a framework, however, to structure disputes so that dis-
agreements focus on the issues upon which disagreement exists.
In that way, even when we do not like the result of a particular
case, we can at least say that the Court gave serious consider-
ation to the significant issues. By and large, our long history of
respecting the linguistic wall, and the narrow version of lenity
routinely used today, combine to accomplish this limited goal.
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